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## **From Policy to Polity: Democracy, Paternalism, and the Incorporation of Disadvantaged Citizens**

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**PART A.**

**Table S1.** Sample Demographic, Social Marginality, Government Assistance, Political and Civic Participation, and Contextual Characteristics

	Nonimputed Mean (SD)	Imputed Mean (SD)
<b>Demographic Characteristics</b>		
Female	.56 (.50)	.56 (.50)
Has college-educated parent	.19 (.39)	.19 (.39)
African American	.49 (.50)	.49 (.50)
Latino	.11 (.31)	.11 (.31)
Noncitizen	.09 (.29)	.10 (.30)
Age	29.49 (6.81)	29.49 (6.81)
Education	1.28 (.99)	1.27 (.99)
Married	.37 (.48)	.37 (.48)
Income-to-poverty ratio	2.34 (3.21)	2.24 (3.20)
<b>Social Marginality Characteristics</b>		
Material hardships	1.84 (1.97)	1.84 (1.97)
Conviction	.07 (.25)	.07 (.25)
Substance use	.24 (.43)	.24 (.43)
Not living with focal child	.11 (.31)	.11 (.31)
Moved between T1 and T3	.06 (.24)	.06 (.24)
Domestic violence	2.05 (.32)	2.07 (.32)
<b>Government Assistance</b>		
Participated in Head Start/Early Head Start	.07 (.26)	.07 (.26)
Lived in public housing project	.19 (.39)	.19 (.39)
Received welfare/TANF	.20 (.40)	.20 (.40)
Received TANF in high paternalism state	.10 (.30)	.10 (.30)
Received TANF in low paternalism state	.10 (.30)	.10 (.30)
<b>Political and Civic Participation</b>		
Voted in November 2000 election	.44 (.50)	.44 (.50)
Participated in political group, demonstration, or voted	.47 (.50)	.47 (.50)
Participated in civic organization or group	.42 (.49)	.42 (.49)
Degree of engagement	.95 (.83)	.95 (.83)
<b>Economic Conditions</b>		
Percent families in poverty (tract)	.18 (.14)	.18 (.14)
MSA unemployment	3.71 (1.13)	3.71 (1.14)
<b>Political Conditions</b>		
Ease of state registration laws	1.81 (.54)	1.81 (.54)
Party competition	.85 (.12)	.85 (.12)
South	.36 (.48)	.36 (.48)
<b>Social Conditions</b>		
Percent state population in poverty	11.57 (2.60)	11.57 (2.60)
Percent state population African American	13.51 (5.97)	13.51 (5.97)
N	4,688 to 7,529	7,529

*Note:* The number of observation range for the nonimputed represents the number of cases without missing data on each item. Statistics for the imputed data are taken from the first of the five imputed datasets created using STATA's ice command.

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**Table S2.** Odds Ratios of All Outcomes with Public Housing Assistance

Predictors	Model 1: Voting	Model 2: Political Participation	Model 3: Civic Participation	Model 4: Degree of Engagement
Type of Government Assistance				
Public housing	.910 (.068)	.906 (.066)	.941 (.065)	.906 (.056)
Demographics				
Female	1.286** (.087)	1.235** (.083)	.893 (.056)	.993 (.057)
Has college-educated parent	1.492** (.109)	1.535** (.110)	1.274** (.092)	1.499**
African American	1.718** (.120)	1.691** (.117)	1.428** (.091)	1.600** (.093)
Latino	1.011 (.125)	1.084 (.130)	1.014 (.107)	1.044 (.101)
Noncitizen		.074** (.012)	.656** (.068)	.263** (.026)
Age	1.053** (.005)	1.053** (.005)	1.034** (.004)	1.051** (.004)
Education	1.620** (.054)	1.610** (.052)	1.393** (.041)	1.593** (.044)
Married	1.205** (.081)	1.191** (.077)	1.684** (.100)	1.545** (.085)
Income-to-poverty ratio	1.073** (.016)	1.080** (.019)	1.019 (.010)	1.040** (.012)
Social Marginality				
Material hardships	.981 (.014)	1.009 (.014)	1.094** (.014)	1.070** (.013)
Conviction	.454** (.054)	.497** (.056)	1.031 (.105)	.736** (.069)
Substance use	1.020 (.068)	1.047 (.068)	.764** (.047)	.851** (.047)
Not living with focal child	.686** (.068)	.802** (.077)	.949 (.085)	.877 (.072)
Moved between T1 and T3	.735** (.085)	.750* (.085)	.786* (.087)	.763** (.078)
Domestic violence	.843 (.121)	.821 (.115)	.940 (.082)	.873 (.091)
Economic Conditions				
Percent families in poverty (tract)	1.837* (.445)	1.951** (.469)	1.490 (.343)	1.755** (.364)
MSA unemployment	1.087** (.029)	1.079** (.028)	.886** (.022)	.965 (.021)
Political Conditions				
Ease of state registration laws	1.159** (.063)	1.153** (.061)	1.132* (.056)	1.162** (.052)
Party competition	2.171** (.571)	1.942** (.488)	1.930** (.456)	1.939** (.414)
South	.641** (.056)	.628** (.053)	.973 (.078)	.770** (.055)
Social Conditions				
Percent state population in poverty	.963** (.014)	.975 (.013)	.989 (.013)	.985 (.011)
Percent state pop. African American	1.009 (.008)	1.009 (.008)	.998 (.007)	1.003 (.006)
LR chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	1268.74 (22)	1839.19 (23)	743.46 (23)	1720.12 (23)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.18	.07	.10

*Note:* N = 7,529. Noncitizens are excluded from voting models (N = 6,774). Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model statistics provided from imputed dataset #1.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

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**Table S3.** Odds Ratios of All Outcomes with Head Start Participation

Predictors	Model 1: Voting	Model 2: Political Participation	Model 3: Civic Participation	Model 4: Degree of Engagement
Type of Government Assistance				
Head Start	1.155 (.122)	1.146 (.120)	1.233* (.122)	1.285** (.115)
Demographics				
Female	1.255** (.086)	1.206** (.082)	.867* (.055)	.957 (.056)
Has college-educated parent	1.496** (.109)	1.539** (.111)	1.275** (.092)	1.503** (.099)
African American	1.698** (.118)	1.670** (.115)	1.413** (.089)	1.578** (.091)
Latino	1.007 (.124)	1.079 (.129)	1.008 (.107)	1.037 (.100)
Noncitizen		.073** (.012)	.657** (.068)	.263** (.026)
Age	1.054** (.005)	1.053** (.005)	1.035** (.004)	1.051** (.004)
Education	1.627** (.054)	1.616** (.052)	1.397** (.041)	1.600** (.044)
Married	1.207** (.081)	1.194** (.077)	1.690** (.101)	1.551** (.085)
Income-to-poverty ratio	1.074** (.016)	1.082** (.019)	1.019 (.010)	1.041** (.012)
Social Marginality				
Material hardships	.980 (.014)	1.008 (.014)	1.093** (.014)	1.068** (.013)
Conviction	.455** (.054)	.498** (.056)	1.034 (.106)	.741** (.069)
Substance use	1.019 (.068)	1.045 (.068)	.762** (.047)	.848** (.047)
Not living with focal child	.692** (.069)	.809* (.078)	.956 (.085)	.887 (.073)
Moved between T1 and T3	.734* (.085)	.749* (.084)	.784* (.086)	.761** (.077)
Domestic violence	.843 (.122)	.821 (.116)	.939 (.081)	.872 (.091)
Economic Conditions				
Percent families in poverty (tract)	1.707* (.405)	1.812* (.427)	1.410 (.317)	1.614* (.326)
MSA unemployment	1.088** (.029)	1.081** (.028)	.886** (.022)	.967 (.021)
Political Conditions				
Ease of state registration laws	1.160** (.063)	1.154** (.061)	1.130* (.056)	1.160** (.052)
Party competition	2.218** (.584)	1.981** (.498)	1.972** (.467)	1.990** (.425)
South	.640** (.056)	.627** (.053)	.974 (.078)	.770** (.055)
Social Conditions				
Percent state population in poverty	.962** (.014)	.974 (.013)	.988 (.012)	.984 (.011)
Percent state pop. African American	1.009 (.008)	1.009 (.008)	.998 (.007)	1.003 (.006)
LR chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	1269.11 (22)	1839.04 (23)	747.34 (23)	1725.87 (23)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.18	.07	.10

*Note:* N = 7,529. Noncitizens are excluded from voting models (N = 6,774). Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model statistics provided from imputed dataset #1.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

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**Table S4.** Odds Ratios of All Outcomes with All Three Types of Government Assistance

Predictors	Model 1: Voting	Model 2: Political Participation	Model 3: Civic Participation	Model 4: Degree of Engagement
<b>Type of Government Assistance</b>				
TANF	.851* (.063)	.852* (.062)	.838* (.060)	.859* (.055)
Head Start	1.179 (.125)	1.171 (.123)	1.259* (.125)	1.312** (.118)
Public Housing	.927 (.070)	.922 (.068)	.957 (.067)	.918 (.058)
<b>Demographics</b>				
Female	1.311** (.093)	1.260** (.089)	.904 (.059)	.997 (.060)
Has college-educated parent	1.492** (.109)	1.535** (.110)	1.273** (.092)	1.500** (.099)
African American	1.730** (.121)	1.703** (.118)	1.436** (.092)	1.609** (.093)
Latino	1.016 (.125)	1.090 (.131)	1.018 (.108)	1.050 (.101)
Noncitizen		.072** (.012)	.644** (.067)	.259** (.025)
Age	1.053** (.005)	1.053** (.005)	1.034** (.004)	1.051** (.004)
Education	1.613** (.053)	1.603** (.052)	1.386** (.041)	1.586** (.043)
Married	1.192** (.080)	1.179* (.076)	1.667** (.099)	1.533** (.084)
Income-to-poverty ratio	1.071** (.016)	1.078** (.018)	1.018 (.010)	1.039** (.012)
<b>Social Marginality</b>				
Material hardships	.982 (.014)	1.011 (.014)	1.096** (.015)	1.070** (.013)
Conviction	.459** (.054)	.502** (.057)	1.043 (.107)	.746** (.070)
Substance use	1.019 (.068)	1.045 (.068)	.762** (.047)	.849** (.047)
Not living with focal child	.679** (.068)	.793* (.076)	.937 (.084)	.869 (.071)
Moved between T1 and T3	.738** (.085)	.753* (.085)	.788* (.087)	.765** (.078)
Domestic violence	.846 (.122)	.823 (.115)	.941 (.082)	.874 (.090)
<b>Economic Conditions</b>				
Percent families in poverty (tract)	1.873* (.457)	1.990** (.481)	1.522 (.352)	1.777** (.369)
MSA unemployment	1.085** (.029)	1.077** (.028)	.885** (.022)	.964 (.021)
<b>Political Conditions</b>				
Ease of state registration laws	1.158** (.063)	1.152** (.061)	1.129* (.056)	1.158** (.052)
Party competition	2.175** (.573)	1.942** (.489)	1.940** (.460)	1.957** (.419)
South	.635** (.056)	.623** (.053)	.966 (.078)	.765** (.055)
<b>Social Conditions</b>				
Percent state pop. in poverty	.964* (.014)	.976 (.013)	.990 (.013)	.986 (.011)
Percent state pop. African American	1.009 (.008)	1.009 (.008)	.998 (.007)	1.003 (.006)
LR $\chi^2$ (df)	1275.51 (24)	1845.94 (25)	753.99 (25)	1734.09 (25)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.18	.07	.11

*Note:* N = 7,529. Noncitizens are excluded from voting models (N = 6,774). Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model statistics provided from imputed dataset #1.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

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**Table S5.** Odds Ratios of All Outcomes with TANF and Paternalism Index

Predictors	Model 1: Voting	Model 2: Political Participation	Model 3: Civic Participation	Model 4: Degree of Engagement
<b>Type of Government Assistance</b>				
Receiving TANF – High	.802* (.076)	.789* (.074)	.689** (.064)	.720** (.059)
Receiving TANF – Low	.903 (.086)	.916 (.086)	1.028 (.093)	1.023 (.083)
TANF benefit generosity	.952 (.036)	.975 (.037)	.983 (.035)	.992 (.032)
<b>Demographics</b>				
Female	1.337** (.094)	1.280** (.089)	.927 (.060)	1.024 (.061)
Has college-educated parent	1.497** (.109)	1.541** (.111)	1.282** (.093)	1.512** (.100)
African American	1.728** (.121)	1.697** (.118)	1.435** (.091)	1.599** (.093)
Latino	1.025 (.127)	1.094 (.131)	1.025 (.109)	1.051 (.101)
Noncitizen		.073** (.012)	.649** (.068)	.260** (.026)
Age	1.053** (.005)	1.053** (.005)	1.034** (.004)	1.050** (.004)
Education	1.616** (.053)	1.606** (.052)	1.387** (.041)	1.591** (.043)
Married	1.191** (.080)	1.178* (.076)	1.666** (.100)	1.530** (.084)
Income-to-poverty ratio	1.072** (.016)	1.079** (.019)	1.019 (.010)	1.040** (.012)
<b>Social Marginality</b>				
Material hardships	.983 (.014)	1.012 (.014)	1.100** (.015)	1.075** (.013)
Conviction	.461** (.055)	.504** (.057)	1.049 (.107)	.746** (.070)
Substance use	1.020 (.068)	1.046 (.068)	.762** (.047)	.850** (.047)
Not living with focal child	.679** (.068)	.793* (.076)	.932 (.083)	.866 (.071)
Moved between T1 and T3	.740* (.085)	.755* (.085)	.790* (.087)	.767* (.078)
Domestic violence	.848 (.121)	.825 (.114)	.943 (.082)	.876 (.090)
<b>Economic Conditions</b>				
Percent families in poverty (tract)	1.844* (.442)	1.947** (.463)	1.544 (.351)	1.764** (.360)
MSA unemployment	1.084** (.029)	1.077** (.028)	.881** (.022)	.962 (.021)
<b>Political Conditions</b>				
Ease of state registration laws	1.154** (.063)	1.153** (.061)	1.129* (.056)	1.163** (.053)
Party competition	1.852* (.546)	1.808* (.513)	1.935* (.520)	2.000** (.484)
South	.593** (.066)	.607** (.066)		.792* (.073)
<b>Social Conditions</b>				
Percent state population in poverty	.964* (.014)	.974 (.014)	.984 (.013)	.980 (.012)
Percent state pop African American	1.009 (.008)	1.008 (.008)	.995 (.007)	1.000 (.006)
LR chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	1274.60 (24)	1844.36 (25)	760.03 (25)	1734.38 (25)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.18	.07	.11

*Note:* N = 7,529. Noncitizens are excluded from voting models (N = 6,774). Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model statistics provided from imputed dataset #1.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

## PART B. ACCOUNTING FOR NONINDEPENDENCE OF OBSERVATIONS

Three methods offer plausible approaches to accounting for the nonindependence of observations in our analysis: clustered robust standard errors, survey estimation techniques, and multilevel modeling.

Clustered robust standard errors (CSREs) allow researchers to correct for the clustering of observations by inflating standard errors according to the degree of nonindependence. Unfortunately, this method is not a viable option for the analyses presented here. When CSREs are employed, the models produce coefficient estimates and standard errors for individual variables, but they consistently fail to compute model fit statistics because the number of predictors exceeds the number of clusters. There simply is not enough information to calculate the tests. Even if this practical difficulty did not exist, the use of CSREs is not recommended when observations are distributed across clusters in an unbalanced manner (i.e., unequal numbers of observations per cluster), as is the case with the Fragile Families data. Moreover, CSREs offer a method of correcting standard errors that is, in general, weaker than multilevel modeling: both approaches correct the degrees of freedom in numerator of the standard error so that it reflects the number of clusters, but only the latter proves a correction for the denominator degrees of freedom (Stata Library: Analyzing Correlated (Clustered) Data. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group from <http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/library/cpsu.htm> (accessed January 20, 2010).

Survey techniques offer a second approach to adjusting our analyses to reflect the nonindependence of observations. This method is appropriate if the data were collected through cluster sampling. Sampling units in clusters typically results in larger sample-to-sample variability than sampling units independently. Using techniques that accommodate complex surveying account for the increased variability in standard error estimates, hypothesis testing, and other forms of inference when (Stata Survey Data Reference Manual Release 11). Indeed, the Fragile Families data meet this criterion because surveys were conducted by sampling from hospitals in cities. Unfortunately, as in the CSREs approach,

models using survey techniques produce coefficient estimates and standard errors for individual variables but fail to generate model fit statistics because the number of predictors exceeds the number of clusters. Again, we confront the problem of not having enough information to calculate the tests.

Multilevel modeling (MLM) offers a third approach to adjusting for the clustered nature of our data. MLM adjusts for the nonindependence of observations by taking into account the clusters (or level-2 units) in which the observations are nested. This technique is often used to partition the variance of outcomes and estimate the amount of variance explained by variables at different levels of analysis. A primary factor to consider when evaluating the suitability of MLM is the number of clusters available in the data. As the number of clusters gets smaller, so does one's ability to estimate complex models that include multiple variables observed in the level-2 units. A general rule of thumb for MLM estimation is that one should have something on the order of 1 to 2 cluster-level predictors per 10 clusters. Because our models include 3 to 4 cluster-level predictors per 10 clusters, the MLM estimates should be viewed with caution. Even though it provides estimates of both individual coefficients, standard errors, and fit statistics, the rule of thumb suggests such a model is inadvisable.

Despite the shortcomings of each approach, we sought to ensure that our results are robust to these techniques by estimating our models with each approach and then comparing the results with the findings we report in the text based on unadjusted models. Tables S6 and S7 show the results produced when each approach is applied to an analysis where TANF receipt predicts voting participation. The multilevel models presented here are specified with a random intercept, meaning that the intercept is allowed to vary across clusters/cities. The first columns of Tables S6 and S7 correspond to the estimates presented in Tables 3 and 4. Using the CSREs and survey adjustment methods, the point estimates do not change, only the standard errors. In multilevel modeling, however, the point estimates are slightly different because the variability in the predictors and residuals is treated differently in a multilevel model.

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**Table S6.** Comparison of Methods for Taking into Account the Clustered Nature of the Fragile Families Data Predicting Voting

Predictors	No Adjustment	Clustered Standard Errors	Survey Method	Multilevel
TANF	.849* (.063)	.849* (.052)	.849* (.052)	.866 (.064)
LR chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	1271.92 (22)	Not estimated	Not estimated	869.94 (22)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.14	Not estimated	Not estimated

*Note:* N = 7,529. Voting models include citizens only (N = 6,774), other models include a variable for citizenship. Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Wald chi<sup>2</sup> estimated for multilevel model.  
 \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

**Table S7.** Comparison of Methods for Taking into Account the Clustered Nature of the Fragile Families Data Predicting Voting

Predictors	No Adjustment	Clustered Standard Errors	Survey Method	Multilevel
Rec TANF – High	.802* (.076)	.802* (.074)	.802* (.074)	.772** (.075)
Rec TANF – Low	.903 (.086)	.903 (.059)	.903 (.059)	.983 (.099)
LR chi <sup>2</sup> (df)	1274.60 (24)	Not estimated	Not estimated	875.14 (24)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.14	Not estimated	Not estimated

*Note:* N = 7,529. Voting models include citizens only (N = 6,774), other models include a variable for citizenship. Models also include a measure of TANF benefit generosity. Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Wald chi<sup>2</sup> estimated for multilevel model.  
 \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

**Table S8.** Odds Ratios of Political and Civic Participation by Receipt of Government Assistance Taken Separately using Multilevel Modeling

Predictors	Voting	Political Participation	Civic Participation	Degree of Engagement
TANF	.866 (.064)	.857* (.063)	.843* (.060)	.850* (.062)
Head Start	1.158 (.123)	1.142 (.120)	1.233* (.122)	1.255* (.135)
Public Housing	.938 (.070)	.932 (.068)	.941 (.065)	.979 (.069)

*Note:* N = 7,529. Voting models include citizens only (N = 6,774), other models include a variable for citizenship. Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each of these odds ratios is taken from models estimated separately where each outcome is predicted with only one type of receipt. Degree of Engagement is coded dichotomously because the multilevel modeling program utilized does not allow ordered logistic regressions (xtme- commands in Stata).  
 \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

**Table S9.** Odds Ratios of Political and Civic Participation by Receipt of Multiple Types of Government Assistance using Multilevel Modeling

Predictors	Voting	Political Participation	Civic Participation	Degree of Engagement
TANF	.865 (.065)	.857* (.063)	.838* (.060)	.842* (.062)
Head Start	1.177 (.126)	1.163 (.123)	1.259* (.125)	1.276* (.137)
Public Housing	.953 (.072)	.948 (.070)	.957 (.067)	.995 (.071)

*Note:* N = 7,529. Voting models include citizens only (N = 6,774), other models include a variable for citizenship. Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Degree of Engagement is coded dichotomously because the multilevel modeling program utilized does not allow ordered logistic regressions (xtme- commands in Stata).  
 \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).



**Table S10.** Odds Ratios of Political and Civic Participation by Receipt of TANF in States with High and Low Paternalism Index Scores using Multilevel Modeling

Predictors	Voting	Political Participation	Civic Participation	Degree of Engagement
Receiving – High	.772** (.075)	.770** (.074)	.681** (.065)	.729** (.068)
Receiving – Low	.983 (.099)	.963 (.095)	1.039 (.097)	1.008 (.099)

*Note:* N = 7,529. Voting models include citizens only (N = 6,774), other models include a variable for citizenship. Models also include a measure of TANF benefit generosity. Values represent coefficients (log odds) from logistic regression converted to odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Degree of Engagement is coded dichotomously because the multilevel modeling program utilized does not allow ordered logistic regressions (xtme- commands in Stata).

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests).

## PART C. DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES

**VOTING.** If respondents reported being eligible to vote, they were asked, “Did you vote in the November 2000 election?” Respondents answering affirmatively to the voting question were coded as voting.

**POLITICAL PARTICIPATION.** We coded respondents as having participated politically if they reported voting; participating in a political, civic, or human rights organization in the past 12 months; or ever participating in a political demonstration or march. Respondents were read the following statement: “Now I have some questions about your involvement or participation in different kinds of groups and organizations. Please tell me whether you have participated in any of the following in the past 12 months, that is, since (FIRST OF MONTH ONE YEAR AGO). Have you participated in...” A list of several types of organizations and groups followed, including, “A political, civic, or human rights organization.” The final component of the political participation measure comes from a question that asked, “Have you ever taken part in a political demonstration or march?”

**CIVIC PARTICIPATION.** We coded respondents as having participated civically if they reported participating in a civic group in the past 12 months. Respondents were read the following statement: “Now I have some questions about your involvement or participation in different kinds of groups and organizations. Please tell me whether you have participated in any of the following in the past 12 months, that is, since (FIRST OF MONTH ONE YEAR AGO). Have you participated in...” A list of several types of organizations and groups followed. We included the following groups and organizations in the civic participation measure: A group affiliated with your church in the past year; a service club, such as the Police Athletic League or the Scouts; a labor union or other work-related group; or a community organization, such as a neighborhood watch.

**TANF PARTICIPATION.** We coded respondents as receiving TANF if they answered affirmatively to the questions asking whether they currently or in the time since the last interview were receiving welfare/TANF in the Year 1 or Year 3 Follow up.

**HEAD START/EARLY HEAD START PARTICIPATION.** We coded respondents as participating in the Head Start/Early Head Start Program if they indicated that their primary care arrangement was Head Start/Early Head Start or that they received assistance to help pay for childcare from Head Start/Early Head Start in the Year 1 or Year 3 Follow up.

**PUBLIC HOUSING PARTICIPATION.** We coded respondents as receiving public housing assistance if they answered affirmatively that the home they currently lived in was a public housing project at Baseline, Year 1 Follow up, or Year 3 Follow up.

**EDUCATION.** Respondents’ educational attainment was coded into four categories as follows: 0 = less than high school graduate; 1 = high school graduate or obtained GED or ABE; 2 = some college or tech degree; and 3 = four-year college degree (BA) or higher.

**CRIMINAL CONVICTION.** We coded respondents as having a criminal conviction if they responded affirmatively to a question asking if they had ever been convicted of any charges not counting minor traffic violations at Year 1 or Year 3 Follow up. We took information from Year 3; when missing, we filled in with Year 1 data.

**NOT RESIDING WITH CHILD.** We coded respondents as not living with the focal child if they reported that the child spent none of the time living with them at the Year 3 Follow up.

**DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.** The measure of domestic violence included in the models is a composite of two

items asking respondents in the Year 3 Follow up interview how often the mother/father of the child slaps or kicks you, and how often the mother/father hits you with a fist or an object that can hurt you. There are three response categories: often, sometimes, and never; higher values indicate more domestic violence.

**MATERIAL HARDSHIPS.** The measure of material hardships is a count of how many material hardships were reported by the respondent, which we capped at a maximum of 5. The hardships are asked of experiences in the past year and are taken from the Year 3 Follow up interview. The hardships include telephone service disconnected; electricity turned off; gas/oil service turned off; home uncomfortably cold for 48 hours or more; no running water for 48 hours or more; receive free food or meals; unable to pay full rent or mortgage; evicted from home; unable to pay full gas/oil/electricity bill; borrowed money from friends/family; moved in with other people because of financial problems; stayed in a shelter/car/abandoned building; did not see a doctor or go to the hospital; cut back on buying yourself clothes; and worked overtime or took second job.

**SUBSTANCE ABUSE.** We calculated the measure of substance abuse using the code provided on the Fragile Families Web site. The indicator of substance abuse is positive if a respondent is found to be either alcohol or drug dependent. Alcohol dependence is measured as having four or more drinks in one day in the past 12 months. Drug dependence is indicated by any use of the following drugs: sedatives, tranquilizers, amphetamines, analgesics, inhalants, marijuana, cocaine, LSD/hallucinogens, or heroin.

**PERCENT IN POVERTY.** Percent of families living below the federal poverty line in the tract in 1999. Source: 2000 Census.

**UNEMPLOYMENT RATE.** Unemployment rate in the Metropolitan Statistical Area in the year of the mother's baseline interview. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

**EASE/DIFFICULTY OF REGISTRATION INDEX.** This index combines three separate measures of registration laws at the state level: motor voter, closing date, and mail registration. We coded each law as a dichotomous indicator and then combined them into an additive index that ranges from 0 to 3. The motor voter element indicates whether states had Motor Voter registration implemented. The closing date element is a dichotomous coding of the number of days between voter registration closing and election day, recoded so that high values indicate a

later closing date (easier to register). Having 25 days or higher is coded as easy registration (because of the reverse coding). The mail registration element indicates whether a state allowed voter registration by mail. Source: Council of State Governments 1996.

**INTERPARTY COMPETITION.** The difference between proportions of seats controlled by Democrats and Republicans in a state's lower and upper legislative chambers. Source: Soss, Joe, Sanford F. Schram, Thomas Vartanian, and Erin O'Brien. 2001. "Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:378–95.

**INDICATOR FOR SOUTH.** The South is defined as the U.S. Census Bureau defined region – South (DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX).

**PERCENT AFRICAN AMERICAN.** The percent African American in the state in 1999. Source: 2000 Census, U.S. Census Bureau.

**PERCENT IN POVERTY:** The percent of people in poverty in the state in 1999. Source: 2000 Census, U.S. Census Bureau.

**TANF BENEFIT.** The average monthly benefit for AFDC/TANF families in 2000 taken from Table 7-9 of the 2004 Green Book and adjusted for the difference in cost of living across states using the Berry, Fording, and Hanson cost-of-living index for 2000. We divided this measure by 100 so that the unit of change for the coefficient is \$100 instead of \$1.

**TANF RESTRICTIONS INDEX.** This index is an additive measure of work requirements (whether a state required recipients to find work sooner than the federal standard of 24 months, coded 1 for states with standards stricter than federal requirements); time limits (whether a state adopted a maximum time limit for receiving benefits shorter than the federal standard of 60 months, coded 1 for states with time limits shorter than 60 months); and stringency of sanctions (penalties for failing to comply with the new welfare rules, coded 0 for states with weak sanctions [i.e., sanctions that are delayed or applied to benefits received by the adult but not the child]; coded 1 for states with moderate sanctions [i.e., sanctions that are delayed but applied to the whole family]; and coded 2 for states with strong sanctions [i.e., sanctions are immediately applied to benefits for the whole family]). The index ranges from 0 to 5; higher values indicate more punitive/harsh restrictions. A restrictions index score of 3 or higher is considered punitive.