

**The 2002 Iowa House and Senate Elections
The More things Change...**

David Redlawsk, University of Iowa and Arthur Sanders, Drake University

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In the 2002 election cycle, Iowa was unique in having a competitive Senate race and four out of five competitive U.S. House races. In a sense Iowa was the center of the midterm political universe, because of the highly competitive nature of the state as a whole and the way in which Iowa draws its congressional district lines.² With so many competitive elections, money and interest group activity flowed into the state in unprecedented amounts.

Iowa is, in the words of the *Almanac of American Politics*, a state characterized by “steady moderation” with almost equal numbers of registered Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.³ Al Gore carried the state in 2000 by just over 4,000 votes, which indicates the potential competitive nature of any statewide race, but the key to the perceived competitiveness of the 2002 U.S. House contests was the decennial redistricting process. Iowa is unique in its use of a truly nonpartisan redistricting method. The nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau (LSB) draws the plan according to a number of principles (e.g., no counties are to be divided, population should be even) which is then subject to approval by the legislature and the governor, who must vote the plan up or down without change. Critical to this process is the requirement that the LSB not

¹ We would like to thank our very able research assistants: Lauren Clayton, Nicole Cooper, Brian Wold (all at Drake University), Nate Green, John Meyer, Stephanie Duck, and Ben Bergmann (all at the University of Iowa).

² Thomas Beaumont, “Political hot spot? It's Iowa,” *Des Moines Register*, 4 September 2002. National media spotlighted Iowa throughout the campaigns. The Christian Science Monitor called Iowa “Election Ground Zero” (Liz Marlantes, “Iowa: Election Ground Zero,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 August 2002) and it and other national daily papers routinely covered the goings on in Iowa as a major story.

consider where incumbents live in developing district lines. In this redistricting cycle, the Republican legislature turned down the first map offered by LSB, but approved the second, which the governor signed. The new plan created four competitive seats and one safe Republican district, the new Fifth District.⁴ Incumbents Leonard Boswell (Democrat) and Jim Leach (Republican) were forced to move their residences to campaign for office for a new district in 2002.

Republican Incumbents Jim Nussle, Jim Leach, and Tom Latham were running in the new First, Second, and Fourth Districts respectively, and each was in a district less amenable to them than their previous districts. Democratic incumbent Leonard Boswell was in the new Third District, which was slightly more Democratic than his previous district but was almost entirely new to him. Redistricting also created potentially competitive state level races. Incumbent Governor Tom Vilsack, who had won a narrow victory with 52% of the vote in 1998, was facing a strong Republican challenge from Republican Doug Gross. And the narrow Republican leads in both the State Senate (29-21) and State House (56-44) were seen as vulnerable. Because of the perception of competition in Iowa races, money poured into the state and parties, interest groups, and the press took notice.

The Candidates

The Senate

³ Michael Barone and Richard Cohen, *Almanac of American Politics, 2002* (Washington, D.C.: The National Journal), 592.

⁴ Where the new First through Fourth Districts are nearly evenly matched in partisan registration, Republicans outnumber Democrats in the Fifth District by about 55,000 voters.

Senator Tom Harkin, the Democratic incumbent, was attempting to become the first four-term Democratic senator in Iowa history. Harkin's last election in 1996 was his most difficult battle in twenty-eight years in Congress, winning 52 percent of the vote, and thus appearing vulnerable to another strong Republican challenge. Harkin is also a polarizing figure. A week before this election, Steve Roberts, a member of the Iowa Republican Party State Committee, speaking before the Iowa Conference of Political Scientists, noted that "if Harkin won," Roberts would begin raising money the next day for the "very important purpose of getting Tom Harkin out of the Senate."⁵ Harkin's traditional election strategy is to paint his Republican opponents as too far to the right. But against his clearly moderate Republican challenger, Greg Ganske, that would not work. Instead, Harkin needed to be able to blunt Ganske's likely attempt to paint him as too far to the left and to use his position as Chair of the Senate Agricultural Committee to pick up more than his usual number of votes in rural Iowa to make up for potential losses of moderate suburban votes

In his four terms in Congress, Republican challenger Ganske compiled a moderate voting record and a reputation for independence from Republican House leaders. Ganske is a plastic surgeon and has taken a visible and active role on healthcare issues, leading bipartisan efforts to pass a Patients' Bill of Rights and prescription drug coverage. Unlike his Georgia colleague Charles Norwood, Ganske refused the strong requests from the White House that he take his name off the largely Democratic version of the Patients' Bill of Rights, and Ganske expressed concern that, on this issue, the Republicans were

⁵ Steven Roberts, speaking at the Annual Meeting of the Iowa Conference of Political Scientists, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa., 2 November 2002

“in the pockets of the HMOs.”⁶ As a result of his moderate image, Ganske received a surprisingly strong challenge in the Republican Senate primary by political novice Bill Salier who made accusations that Ganske was not conservative enough for the Republican Party. Ganske won a surprisingly close race by a margin of 58 percent to 41 percent, a race that left Ganske needing to strengthen his support among conservative Republicans.

Iowa 1

Critical to understanding the strategy employed by the campaigns is the fact that the new First District now incorporated urban Scott County, the third largest in Iowa, where the previous district had been primarily rural with only a few small cities. More than 40 percent of the First District’s population was new. Republican incumbent Jim Nussle was keenly aware of this shift, and his campaign spent much of its time focused on Scott County, which happened to be the home of Nussle’s opponent, Ann Hutchinson, Mayor of Bettendorf. According to Nick Ryan, Nussle’s campaign manager, as soon as the new lines were set and it became clear that incumbent Jim Leach would move to the new Second District, Nussle began an intensive effort to become known in Scott County.⁷ Nussle opened an office in Scott County and used his position as chair of the House Budget Committee to begin a major initiative to gain commitments for a new bridge for I-74. This effort culminated in a visit by Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) in May 2002,

⁶ Quoted in Michael Barone and Richard Cohen, *Almanac of American Politics, 2002* (Washington, D.C.: The National Journal), 601.

⁷ Nick Ryan, Nussle Campaign Manager, interview by David Redlawsk, Davenport, Iowa, 22 November 2002.

during which Hastert announced his support for the bridge. Much of Nussle's campaign focused on his ability as incumbent to continue to do good things for eastern Iowa and Scott County in particular.

Nussle's opponent, Ann Hutchinson, defeated former Democratic Congressman, Dave Nagle, in a June primary.⁸ The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) encouraged and supported Hutchinson over Nagle.⁹ Interestingly, Hutchinson had been a Republican for most of her political career, including fourteen years as mayor of Bettendorf, Iowa. After George W. Bush became president, Hutchinson unsuccessfully applied for an administration position. This episode formed the core of the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) attacks on her as the campaign moved into its later stages. Perhaps because of the Bush rebuff, Hutchinson was convinced by Democrats to change parties and run for Congress in the first District.¹⁰ The early days of her campaign were fraught with problems, as she quickly went through three campaign managers, finally settling on Sarah Kendall in late August.¹¹ Much of Hutchinson's campaign was designed to convince Quad Cities-area voters that Nussle was just too conservative to represent them in Congress, seemingly a good strategy in a district where registered Democrats outnumbered registered Republicans by about 4,500.

Iowa 2

⁸ Nagle had been ousted by Jim Nussle in 1990, 50 percent to 49 percent.

⁹ "Primaries in Alabama, Iowa, and New Jersey Top Bill in Tomorrow's Races," *Roll Call*, 3 June 2002.

¹⁰ When challenged about her party switch, Hutchinson claimed to be a "lifelong Democrat" who registered as a Republican in 1988 simply to vote for a friend in a Republican primary. Mayoral elections in Bettendorf are nonpartisan. (Orlan Love, "Hutchinson: Congress a Chance to Serve," *Cedar Rapids Gazette*, 2002. At <<http://www.gazetteonline.com/special/vote2002/annhutchinson.html>>, 17 December 2002.)

¹¹ Ed Tibbetts, *Quad City Times* Political Reporter, interview by Nate Green, Davenport, Iowa, 22 November 2002.

In what was one of the most unusual incumbent campaigns in the country, Republican Jim Leach faced the strongest challenge of his twenty-six-year congressional career. While Leach's previous district had always leaned Democratic, Leach always garnered enough Democratic votes to maintain his seat by casting himself as an iconoclast, a throwback to the old collegial days of politics, and as among the most liberal Republicans in Congress. Redistricting threatened to change everything. The new Second District became the strongest Democratic district in Iowa, and most importantly for Leach, did not include his home in Scott County. So Leach moved to a new home just outside Iowa City and set out to build support in the new significantly more Democratic district.¹²

To do so Leach touted his independent record and his refusal to go along with many Republican-endorsed policies. Leach also made known his distaste for fundraising and for the adversarial nature of modern campaigns. He came out very early, just after the uncontested primaries, and called for his opponent to agree to campaign contribution and spending limits. He also called for a positive race, without the character attacks he said have now taken over the election process.¹³ Leach made this a central campaign issue, running commercials and speaking publicly about the issue many times. As part of his apparently sincere belief that campaigns should only be run by candidates, Leach even requested that his own party and other outside interest groups stop running ads for him and/or against his opponent, citing that the ads were often misleading. While Julie

¹² An exit poll by David Redlawsk carried out in portions of Johnson County showed that about 20 percent of self-described Democrats voted for Leach, while 57 percent of independents did.

¹³ "Sparring over Leach Funding," *Iowa City Gazette*, 12 July 2002.

Adams, Leach's campaign manager, clearly supported his beliefs, she also indicated that his self-imposed limitations created a serious financial challenge for the campaign.¹⁴

Leach's Democratic challenger, Cedar Rapids pediatrician Dr. Julie Thomas, had been heavily involved in lobbying for healthcare-related issues, but had never before run for office. Thomas, recognizing that redistricting provided her the rare opportunity to unseat a long-time incumbent, showed her viability early by working to set up a core of supporters and volunteers, and securing visits from many high-profile, nationally-recognized Democrats such as John Kerry (D-Mass.), Nancy Pelosi (D-N.Y.), and Al Gore. She also showed fundraising prowess early on after jump-starting her campaign with a \$200,000 personal loan. Ultimately she outraised Leach by a two-to-one margin. Thomas began her campaign by introducing herself to the district by running a series of commercials that showed her as a compassionate physician who would work for Iowa's families all with the same tag: "Thanks, Dr. Thomas!" Thomas then went on to focus on issues such as education, Social Security, and healthcare, as well as mobilizing traditionally Democratic core groups such as union members. Of most importance to Thomas was the need to convince Democrats to come home to the Democratic Party, when many had been voting for Leach election after election in the parts of the district Leach already represented.

Iowa 3

The Third Congressional District in Iowa was the new home to Democratic incumbent Leonard Boswell. Only about 30 percent of the new district came from his old

¹⁴ Julie Adams, Leach Campaign Manager, interview by David Redlawsk, 13 November 2002.

district. Boswell was elected in 1996 in a hard fought open-seat race by a narrow 49 percent to 48 percent margin and had steadily increased his margin of victory in his two subsequent races.¹⁵ This new district presented particular challenges for Boswell. It was, in fact, more Democratic than his previous district, but the Democrats in the new district were concentrated in the more urban and diverse Polk County and its largest city, Des Moines. There was some concern that Boswell’s substantially rural background would not “play well” among Des Moines Democrats and upscale suburban independents. Boswell was, for example, a long-time member and endorsee of the National Rifle Association (NRA). While an asset in his old district, NRA support was less likely to be helpful in the new Third District. In addition, the Republicans found an attractive challenger.

Republican candidate Stan Thompson was a local Des Moines attorney who had been active in Republican politics for many years and was well connected with the business community. Young and energetic, Thompson seemed to have the strong potential to attract the votes of suburban Des Moines Republicans and Independents, while his upbringing in the small town of Red Oak, Iowa, was potentially appealing to the smaller, more rural, more Republican parts of the district. Republicans were hopeful he could unseat what seemed to be only a semi-incumbent Democrat.

Iowa 4

¹⁵ John Haskell, “Iowa Third District,” in David Magleby and Marianne Holt, eds., *Outside Money: Soft Money & Issue Ads in Competitive 1998 Congressional Elections* (Provo, UT: Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham Young University, 2001), 93–102.

Revised district lines put Republican incumbent Representative Tom Latham into a new Fourth District that, while still leaning Republican, was much more evenly divided and clearly competitive than Latham's previous district. Rural small town Republican areas had been replaced by voters in the western suburbs of Des Moines and the small city of Ames, the home of Iowa State University. In his eight years in Congress, Latham compiled a solid conservative Republican record. Latham feared a strong Democratic candidate might be able to pick up enough moderate independent support, especially in the new parts of the district, to present a strong challenge.

The Democratic candidate was John Norris, long active in the Democratic Party, but never a candidate for office. Norris, an attorney, served on the staff of then-Congressman Tom Harkin, and as chief-of-staff for both Congressman Leonard Boswell and Governor Tom Vilsack. Norris had already announced his candidacy for the Des Moines area seat being vacated by Greg Ganske. But when Leonard Boswell announced his intention to move to Des Moines and run for that seat, Norris moved to Ames to avoid a primary battle with Boswell to run against Latham. He hoped his roots in the small town of Red Oak would help him appeal to rural voters, while also emphasizing his Des Moines political connections for the Independent, and Democratic parts of the district.

The Money

Candidates

Given the competitive nature of nearly all of Iowa's campaigns, it is not surprising that record amounts of money were spent.¹⁶ In the Senate race Harkin raised \$8.9 million and spent \$8.2 million between 1997 and 2002, while Ganske raised \$5 million and spent \$5.3 million in what became the most expensive campaign in Iowa history.¹⁷ For Harkin, 21 percent of his funding came from PAC contributions, while Ganske raised about 15 percent of his funds from PACs. But when the Republican Party began to cut back on its spending later in the campaign, Ganske also ended up spending about \$400,000 of his own money on the race, something Harkin did not have to do. Iowa's Republican Senator, Charles Grassley, also jumped into the race spending money from his campaign committee to make up for a perceived shortfall in party efforts on Ganske's behalf. During the campaign, Ganske attempted to make a point of Harkin's out-of-state support as records show more than 80 percent of Harkin's funding came from outside of Iowa, while only 36 percent of Ganske's did. In the end, both candidates had the resources to saturate the relatively inexpensive Iowa markets with advertising, but Harkin's substantially larger war chest allowed him to respond to everything Ganske threw at him and more.

In the First District, Jim Nussle spent nearly \$1.7 million while challenger Ann Hutchinson spent \$1 million.¹⁸ Given his position as House Budget Committee Chair, Nussle was able to raise funds more easily, than Hutchinson, showing a pattern exactly as one would expect of an incumbent-challenger race, with much of Nussle's advantage

¹⁶ CNN.com, "Spending Records Broken in Races," 23 October 2002, <<http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/23/elec02.governors.spending.ap>>.

¹⁷ All spending and fundraising figures in this paragraph are from the data from the *Center for Responsive Politics*, 2002. At <<http://opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp?cycle=2002&id=IAS2>>, 17 December 2002. Data from FECInfo.com shows that during the 2001–02 fundraising cycle Harkin raised \$7 million and spent \$6.7 million while Ganske raised \$5.4 million and spent \$5.3 million. At <http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_racepg.exe?DoFn=IA002002S>, 17 December 2002.

attributable to his nearly three-to-one lead in PAC money (more than \$950,000 to Hutchinson's \$340,000.)

The tables were turned in the Second District where incumbent Republican Jim Leach was outspent by Democratic challenger Julie Thomas. According to Federal Election Commission (FEC) filings, Leach spent about \$647,000, while Thomas doubled Leach's resources, spending more than \$1.3 million.¹⁹ This unusual dynamic came about because Leach placed strict limits on his fundraising. He refused direct PAC contributions, limited individual contributions to half the legal limit per election cycle, and only took individual contributions from Iowa residents. Thomas operated under no such restrictions, arguing that PAC contributions represent small donors who aggregate their funds through PACs.²⁰ As a result of this imbalance, the Thomas campaign itself was able to use television more than Leach, though the difference was more than made up for by the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC).

In the Third District Leonard Boswell spent about \$1.2 million while challenger Stan Thompson spent \$897,000.²¹ Boswell's advantage here provided him with the flexibility needed to blunt the attacks made not only by Thompson, but by some of the outside groups who came in and spent money in support of Thompson. That group spending, however, was not able to make up for the differences in resources, especially when the Republican Party, which had made an early TV buy of \$485,000 for Thompson pulled much of that money and redirected it to other races in the state it saw as more competitive.

¹⁸ Data from the *FECInfo*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Julie Thomas, in conversation with students in a political campaigning class at the University of Iowa, 10 September 2002.

In the Fourth District, incumbent Tom Latham spent \$1.5 million with challenger John Norris maintaining a rough parity, spending \$1.2 million.²² Norris's ability to almost match Latham in candidate spending kept his campaign hopeful that they could make a last-minute run at the incumbent.

Political Parties

The political parties also spent large sums of money on all five of these races. Soft money was channeled into these contests by all national party committees. According to the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), as of December 2, Iowa ranked ninth in the nation in terms of the amount of money funneled to the state parties from national party soft money accounts, with a total of \$9.6 million. This amount, however, is an understatement since 61 percent of this total came from the Democratic side.²³ The Democrats filtered nearly all of their national money through the Iowa Democratic Party, thus appearing as party-to-party transfers. Virtually all the TV ads and mailings by the Democrats were labeled as paid for by the Iowa Democratic Party. But on the Republican side, while some mailings and ads were paid for by the Republican Party of Iowa, most were paid for directly by the Republican National Committee (RNC), National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), or NRCC. Direct party spending is harder to track in terms of dollars, but it is evident in the number of ads run and mailings sent by

²¹ Data from the *FECInfo*.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ These figures are found in a chart titled "Campaign Cash" at the CRP web site: <<http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/party2state.asp?cycle=2002>>, 17 December 2002. Some of the soft money went to support gubernatorial and legislative campaigns, but much of it went in support for the federal races.

the RNC, NRSC, or NRCC that the Republican Party spent at least as much as the Democrats in races with Republican incumbents. While media reports indicated that the NRCC may have spent as much as \$2 million on television in support of Jim Leach and attacking Julie Thomas,²⁴ figures provided by the NRCC indicate that they spent 1.5 million dollars in this race overwhelming the efforts by the campaigns themselves. In addition, the NRCC claims to have spent 1.4 million dollars for Jim Nussle and 1.1 million for Tom Latham, but only \$300,000 for challenger Stan Thompson.²⁵ And the NRSC claims to have spent \$3.5 million to help Greg Ganske.²⁶

Interest Groups

While many interest groups were involved in the various campaigns in Iowa, interest-group activity was not as prevalent or as visible as expected since groups may have been more focused on “ground war” efforts than on the more visible “air war.”²⁷ Even so, quite a few groups were active in support of favored candidates, and different groups were active in different races. For example, the United Seniors Association

²⁴ Jim VandeHei and Dan Balz, “GOP Win a Lesson in Money, Muscle,” *MSNBC.com*, 10 November 2002. At <<http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/833043.asp?cp1=1>>, 17 December 2002.

²⁵ Mike McElwain, NRCC Political Director, interview by David Magleby and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 2 December 2002.

²⁶ Chris LaCivita, National Republican Senatorial Committee, “FW: Activities by Category - - had a busy year!!,” 11 December 2002, and “Re: Quick Question,” 3 January 2003, personal e-mail to Jonathan Tanner.

worked on behalf of Republican incumbents Jim Nussle, Tom Latham, and Jim Leach. National Right to Life campaigned for Greg Ganske, Tom Latham, and Jim Nussle. The Associated Builders and Contractors and Club for Growth helped Stan Thompson, and the American Medical Association (AMA) worked for Dr. Greg Ganske. On the Democratic side, the Unions campaigned for all Democratic candidates, with the exception of the National Education Association (NEA), which supported Republican Leach in the Second District. The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) helped Harkin, Norris and Leach and the Sierra Club campaigned for Harkin and John Norris, while only endorsing Leach.

The Effects of Money I: The Ground War

Mailings and Contacts

Many interest groups, particularly Democratic allies, concentrated on the ground war rather than the air war. In Iowa, on the Democratic side, interest group involvement revolves around labor unions. The national media reported that a few weeks before Election Day the AFL–CIO dropped all TV spending to concentrate on member contacts and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts, but most Iowa union-based efforts were always focused on the ground war.²⁷ The Iowa Federation of Labor (with some help from the national AFL–CIO) worked to promote Democratic candidates among most of the

²⁷ Several campaign managers and party activists noted this phenomenon in interviews after the election, including Holly Armstrong, Thomas’s manager and Nick Ryan, Nussle’s manager. (Holly Armstrong, interview by David Redlawsk, Iowa City, Iowa, 15 November 2002; Ryan, interview, 22 November 2002.)

²⁸ Liz Marlantes, “With Races Tight, Key is Turnout,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 October 2002.

approximately 135,000 union households.²⁹ Labor contacted members with direct mailings and provided information to local unions to either include in internal newsletters or pass out to union members as leaflets. For the leaflets, local leaders could request customized one page comparisons between the Democratic candidate and his or her Republican opponent on three of nine issues chosen by the local labor affiliate. Labor filled orders for 65,000 of these leaflets in the Senate race, 24,000 in the First District, 23,000 in the Second District, 24,000 in the Third District, and 14,000 in the Fourth District. The smaller number in the Fourth District did not reflect a lack of commitment to Democratic challenger Norris, but the small number of Union members in that more rural district. The Iowa Federation of Labor also asked the local unions to send out federation-made direct mail pieces with a message specifically tailored for that locale; 40,000 of these were sent, all containing an endorsement of Harkin with the appropriate congressional-district message included at the bottom. The Federation also sent out 550 copies of a video to be shown at local union meetings containing an endorsement message from the Iowa Federation of Labor for Tom Harkin and Governor Tom Vilsack. In total, the Iowa Federation spent around \$250,000 on member contacts. In September, the national AFL–CIO projected spending an additional \$200,000 to aid in this effort.³⁰

Similarly, the Iowa State Education Association (ISEA), in conjunction with the NEA, developed a major communication effort. The NEA and the ISEA endorsed Democratic candidates in all of these races except the Second District, where they

²⁹ All the information and figures concerning the Iowa Federation of Labor come from an interview with Mark Smith, Iowa Federation of Labor President, by Arthur Sanders, 5 December 2002.

³⁰ This amount includes money spent on the GOTV, but does not include direct contributions to the candidates or parties, nor does it include additional money spent by affiliated unions such as AFSCME, which, according to Smith, budgeted \$1.5 million for Iowa including at least \$350,000 in the governor's race or SEIU, which focused particularly on the Second District, where most of its members are located. (Sarah Swisher, SEIU Political Director, interview by David Redlawsk, 15 November 2002.)

endorsed Republican Jim Leach because of his moderate image and his stands generally supportive of education,³¹ and in response to the desires of local teachers in the district who wanted to continue a tradition of support for Leach.³² But almost all of their efforts focused on Democratic candidates. The NEA and the ISEA sent three pieces statewide to all member households supporting Harkin, and three pieces in the Third District in support of Boswell. Norris was aided by two mailings, while Leach received only one. In addition, the week before the election, a final reminder piece was sent out statewide in four different versions. Each version had pictures of Harkin and Vilsack on them. The version in the First, Third, and Fourth Districts also had the picture of the Democratic congressional candidate. This was the only mailing in the First District which targeted Hutchinson. In the Second District Harkin and Vilsack but not Leach were pictured, while in the Fifth District, in western Iowa, the mailing was also only for the statewide Democrats. In total, approximately 270,000 pieces of mail were sent to 38,000 households. The NEA spent between \$250,000 and \$300,000 on this effort.³³ Of note is the fact that while endorsing Leach publicly, the teacher's unions did little directly on his behalf. The endorsement was a relatively easy way for the unions to show a public "bipartisan" approach while really doing little to help the one Republican endorsed. At the same time, the NEA has had a small program of "reaching out" to moderate Republicans groups such as the Republican Mainstream Committee, one of whose

³¹ Letter to the Leach campaign from John Hieronymus, President of the Iowa State Teachers Association, July 18, 2002, posted on the campaign website, 2002. At <<http://www.jimleach.com/htmpages/isea.htm>>, 13 January 2003.

³² Angie King, Iowa Education Association Political Director, interview by Arthur Sanders, 4 November 2002.

³³ King, interview, 4 November 2002 and Bill Comer, NEA Iowa Campaign Coordinator, interview by Arthur Sanders, 4 November 2002.

founders was Jim Leach.³⁴ Perhaps more importantly, the NEA, which paid for the effort, was much more interested in helping Democrats. The procedure they use to encourage grassroots activity had resulted in an endorsement of Leach by the ISEA but the fieldworker from the national office who coordinated the campaign was more interested in working to elect the Democrats who had been endorsed.³⁵

In the first District, the United Auto Workers (UAW) played a substantial role in mobilizing its members on behalf of Hutchinson. The UAW, with about ten thousand members in the district, conducted targeted phone banking, door knocking and literature drops, and internal communications that included mailings to members endorsing Hutchinson and other statewide candidates.³⁶

Other Democratic-allied groups were also directly involved. EMILY's List, a national organization supporting pro-choice women candidates, played a large role for the Thomas campaign in the Second District and a somewhat smaller role for Hutchinson in the First District. Besides contributing money to both campaigns, EMILY's List also sent a full-time staffer to Cedar Rapids to work directly with the Thomas campaign. Two other Democratic groups, Neighbor to Neighbor and the 21st Century Democrats, also sent trained staffers to help Thomas.

A range of Republican-allied groups were also active in the ground war. National Right to Life, in conjunction with the Iowa Right to Life Association, sent leaflets to members statewide supporting Ganske, and in the First and Fourth Congressional Districts in support of Nussle and Latham. On the Sunday before the election they also placed these leaflets on cars in the parking lots of conservative Christian churches.

³⁴ "Teachers Union Helps Republicans," *Associated Press*, 18 September 2000.

³⁵ Comer, interview, 4 November 2002.

Several seniors' groups were also involved in support of Republicans throughout Iowa. While the most visible efforts were from the United Seniors Association, which did a great deal of television, the 60 Plus Association, America 21, and the Seniors Coalition all sent mailings to the First and Second Districts touting Republican positions on Medicare, prescription drugs, and Social Security. 60 Plus also sent one mailing on behalf of Latham in the Fourth District.

The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) may have had the most sophisticated Republican-oriented ground war operation in Iowa. Nationally, the NFIB targeted millions of conservative business owners identified through intensive telephone polling between 2000 and 2002, along with labor-like personal contacts.³⁷ The NFIB did not support Ganske for the Senate because he appeared to be opposed to their position on healthcare. The NFIB did support the Republican incumbents in the First and Second Districts and somewhat in the Fourth. Democratic incumbent Leonard Boswell's moderate record and support on important issues to small business, including the estate tax, kept the group largely out of the Third District. According to Eric Berger of the NFIB, the group has about 8,000 members in Iowa, 1,300 each in the First and Second District. Much work was done to contact these members multiple times through both mail and telephone. One internal mailing called for members to volunteer directly with the campaigns; about sixty members responded with offers to help Nussle in the First District, though there was a weaker response to supporting Leach.³⁸ Others requested that members make personal contacts to nonmembers about the importance of voting for

³⁶ David Neal, United Auto Workers, interview by Nate Green, 4 December 2002.

³⁷ Sharon Wolff, Kristen Beaubin, and Dennis Whitfield, NFIB, interviews by Quin Monson and David B. Magleby, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2002.

³⁸ Eric Berger, NFIB, e-mail and telephone interview by Stephanie Duck, 18 December 2002.

Leach and Nussle because of their sensitivity to small business. According to Berger, “many small business owners do not have the time to become informed about campaigns and are more inclined to trust information that comes from other small business owners.”³⁹ In addition to internal mailings, the NFIB sent pure issue mailings to previously identified nonmembers thought to be receptive to their message. These mailers had no candidate push and focused on small business issues like the inheritance tax.

In a similar vein, Business and Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) also worked in Iowa, through what they call their State Prosperity Project, a series of internal communications and Internet web and e-mail connections focused on issues affecting the workplace. Bernadette Budde, senior vice president of BIPAC, called these efforts in Iowa “Very, very successful; hugely successful.”⁴⁰

While campaigns often complain about the role outside groups play, and in particular the difficulty of getting the campaign’s own message through the clutter of outside group messages, the situation in the Second District was unique. Jim Leach’s strong stand against interest group involvement meant that he spent much of the campaign publicly calling on groups to stop their efforts on his behalf. The dilemma for Leach was clear. He was being outspent by Thomas, and group activity (especially the NRCC and the LCV) was essential to keeping him competitive. Yet because he needed to position himself as a moderate, he was concerned about mailings that tied him to “Iowa’s Conservative Values,” as did an ad by the NRCC.⁴¹ Other group mailings also called

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Bernadette Budde, BIPAC senior vice president, interview by Quin Monson, Jonathan Tanner, and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 6 November 2002.

⁴¹ Adams, interview, 13 November 2002.

Leach a conservative, despite the negative effects the label might have in the relatively liberal Second District.

Some nonpartisan groups were active as well. The AARP sent out voter guides in all of the Iowa races. The Senate voter guide was printed in *Modern Maturity*, which reaches 260,000 members in Iowa, and over 25,000 guides were sent in each of the four competitive House races.⁴² The voter guides did not indicate which candidates supported or opposed AARP positions. Instead they described where the AARP stood on key issues, and then listed candidate responses to an AARP questionnaire. All ten of the candidates in these races signed an AARP pledge concerning prescription drugs and Medicare; candidates signed the pledge at staged and publicized events in the First and Second Districts and in Des Moines for the Senate race.

While interest groups were clearly involved in all of the races studied here, much of their efforts were focused on internal communications, with less focus on mail, and even less on television. Even so, in the First District, at least twenty-four different mailings were sent to voters from twelve different nonparty groups, while twenty-five different mailings were sent in the Second District from eleven different groups, and in the Senate race, at least forty-eight different mailings were sent by seventeen different groups (see Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). The numbers in the Third and Fourth Districts were smaller, but still significant, with six groups sending at least seventeen different mailings in the Third District and eight groups sending at least twenty-two mailings in the Fourth District.

⁴² These congressional district voter guides cost \$40,000. As the Senate guide was included in the regular magazine, cost was impossible to determine. This information was provided in an interview with John McCally, Iowa AARP Political Director, by Arthur Sanders, 13 November 2002.

The candidates and parties also sent out numerous mailings. On the Democratic side of the races for the U.S. House, most of the mailings came from the party, not the candidates. For example, in the Boswell campaign, of the nineteen direct mail pieces that were sent, thirteen were paid for by the Iowa Democratic Party. However, in the Democratic Senate race there was a more even division of labor between the state party and the Harkin campaign. On the Republican side the pattern was much more diverse with the candidates, the state party, the RNC, the NRSC and the NRCC all paying for direct mail pieces. Overall, for example in the Second Congressional District race, of the thirty-eight separate pieces of party and candidate mail, only eleven came directly from the two campaigns, with only two from the Leach campaign, who did not even hire a mail consultant.

One thing to note about nearly all of these pieces from the candidates and parties was the extensive use of very distorted pictures of the opposition candidate, especially in the party committee mailings. Both parties used this tactic extensively, but it was particularly noticeable on the Republican side with mailings that used distorted and extremely unflattering pictures of Tom Harkin, Leonard Boswell, and John Norris. The choice of pictures used in attacks on Thomas and Hutchinson were similar, if not quite as nasty. Democrats also used unflattering pictures, though the images were not as distorted.

GOTV

Perhaps the most important part of any ground war is the GOTV effort; here the Democrats and their allies undertook a massive endeavor that clearly affected the

elections.⁴³ This Democratic Coordinated Campaign was an effort by the Iowa Democratic Party to create an on-line voter file and to encourage the use of absentee ballots. They spent over \$3.5 million specifically on this effort. The goal of the voter file was to create a database that could be used by Democratic candidates all over the state from the top of the ticket down to local city precinct elections. Candidates wishing to use the voter file were charged an amount depending upon the size of their district. Those candidates who used the file found it useful.⁴⁴

Iowa law makes voting by absentee ballot very easy, and the Democratic Party hoped to take advantage of this. They began over the summer with one hundred paid canvassers in groups of four placed in key counties. Each group was assigned particular neighborhoods in which to canvass Democratic and Independent voters. Each was equipped with a palm pilot to store the information they gathered about the voter. Stored information was downloaded each evening into the central voter file. At the same time, any voter who seemed inclined to support Democrats in November was asked to complete an absentee ballot request. The party collected these applications and then delivered them to the appropriate county auditor's office in September. In order to prevent too many complaints from county auditors, requests were spread out so as to not all arrive on the first day that they were allowed.

The canvassing started in the greater Des Moines area, where seventeen of twenty initial teams worked, and then spread to the rest of the state, focusing efforts in the most

⁴³ The information about the coordinated campaign comes from the many student interns who worked on the campaign and from an interview with Mark Daley, Iowa Democratic Party Communications Director, by Arthur Sanders, Des Moines, Iowa, 8 November 2002. Information also came from an interview with Rod Sullivan, Johnson County Democratic Central Committee Chair, by David Redlawsk, Iowa City, Iowa, 14 November 2002.

⁴⁴ Julie Stauch, Boswell for Congress Campaign Manager, interview by Arthur Sanders, 12 November 2002.

Democratic areas. By Election Day, there were satellite offices for the coordinated campaign in forty-nine counties. The main office in Polk County/Des Moines was actually housed in the same building as the governor's campaign headquarters, the Harkin campaign, and the Boswell campaign. While each of these campaigns and the Party maintained separate space and phones within the building, the close contact allowed for easy coordination of efforts.

The absentee ballot aspect of this effort was very productive. For example, about 21 percent of the votes in Polk County (Third District) were cast by absentee ballot. Tom Harkin had a 64 to 35 percent lead in these absentee ballots while Leonard Boswell had a 63 to 36 percent lead.⁴⁵ In Johnson County (Second District), nearly 40 percent of all votes were cast absentee, with Harkin taking 71 percent and Thomas soundly defeating Leach with 55 percent of the early vote.⁴⁶ According to a *Des Moines Register* survey of the ten largest counties in Iowa, as of October 24, 113,452 absentee ballots had been sent, 58 percent to registered Democrats; 62 percent of those returned by that time were from Democrats.⁴⁷ Throughout the state a particular effort was made to contact Democrats with a history of voting in presidential elections but not in off-year elections. These Marginal Voter Profile (MVP) voters were the targets of extensive contact. There was even an attempt to pair these voters with a local activist who might encourage them to vote. According to Mark Daly, 33,000 of these voters went to the polls on Election Day,

⁴⁵ Among non-absentee ballots, Harkin had 53 percent of the vote and Boswell had 52 percent. These percentages were calculated by figures on the web page of the Polk County Auditor, 2002. At <<http://election.co.polk.ia.us/DetailCand.asp>>, 3 December 2002.

⁴⁶ By contrast Thomas won only 44 percent and Harkin only 60 percent of the vote cast on Election Day. *Johnson County Auditor web site*, 14 November 2002. At <<http://www.johnson-county.com/auditor/returns/0211us.htm>> for House, <<http://www.johnson-county.com/auditor/returns/0211sen.htm>> for Senate, 18 December 2002.

⁴⁷ Table on Absentee Ballots, *Des Moines Register*, 24 October 2002, 4A.

though others familiar with the program were less convinced of the success of this aspect of it.⁴⁸

Labor and various groups also conducted extensive GOTV efforts. The Iowa Federation of Labor effort was coordinated by the local unions. They often worked with the state Democratic Party providing, for example, two-thirds of the Election Day doorknockers for the Polk County Democratic effort and the space and phones to coordinate the campaign. Phone banks and door knockers were employed by local unions in, among other places, Council Bluffs, Waterloo, and Cedar Rapids. The phone bank effort was particularly focused on voters in the 11 State House and 4 State Senate districts that the IFL had targeted. Over 30,000 calls were made in those districts promoting not only the Democratic state level candidates, but the entire Democratic ticket. The national AFL–CIO made 75,000 “remember to vote” calls the weekend before the election. Similarly, the Iowa Federation of Labor made an automated GOTV call to all members that final weekend, as did the Sierra Club. An extraordinarily sophisticated voter contact and GOTV effort carried out by Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in Johnson County, focused on the Second District race, as well as local legislative races. According to Sarah Swisher, SEIU’s political director, the union bought \$80,000 worth of computers and software to set up a war room with automated calling stations. Running twelve sets of phone banking volunteers per week for twelve weeks, SEIU and the campaigns blanketed eastern Iowa union members in particular. Campaigns could also lease time on the phone banks and bring in their own volunteers (Thomas did this).

⁴⁸ Mark Daley, interview by Arthur Sanders, 8 November 2002. Mark Smith, Iowa Federation of Labor President, expressed skepticism in his interview by Arthur Sanders, 5 December 2002.

Efforts on the Republican side were less centrally organized. The party tried to promote absentee ballots, especially after it became clear that the Democratic effort was so extensive. Mailings with President Bush's picture were sent to Republicans throughout the state including a plea to consider an absentee vote and an application for an absentee ballot. But the efforts were primarily focused at the county level. The state party's efforts were largely devoted to helping the county parties organize their own GOTV and absentee ballot drives. Anne Warren, communications director for the Ganske campaign noted that they learned a hard lesson from their failure to match Democratic efforts in this area.⁴⁹ In fact, the major Republican response to the absentee ballot issue was to complain that the Democrats were engaged in massive voter fraud. State Party Chair Chuck Larson Jr. even brought in a private investigator to help expose vote fraud tied to the Democrats absentee ballot campaign claiming they could not trust the Democratically controlled county controllers offices.⁵⁰ But in the end, nothing ever came from this independent Republican investigation. The NRA also made phone calls to members reminding them to vote, but only in the First District for Nussle and in the Fourth for Latham.⁵¹

This Republican effort in Iowa contrasts with more successful GOTV efforts in other places organized around the "72 Hour Task Force" and the "Strategic Task Force to Organize and Mobilize People."⁵² Clearly, the decision to leave much of the planning at

⁴⁹ Anne Warren, Ganske for Senate Communications Director, phone interview by Arthur Sanders, 19 November 2002.

⁵⁰ Okamoto, Lynn, "Democrats Pace Absentee Vote: Republicans on Hunt for Possible Fraud." *Des Moines Register*, 24 October 2002, A1.

⁵¹ Chuck Cunningham, NRA Director of Federal Affairs, Institute for Legislative Action, interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, Jonathan Tanner, and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.

⁵² See the Introductory chapter by David Magelby and Quin Monson in this collection, and a number of the other case studies including the Missouri Senate Race by Terrance Jones, Matt McLaughlin, Martha Kropf

the county level was part of this, especially since Iowa has 99 counties. That made coordination difficult. Equally telling, was the emphasis in the national Republican efforts on traditional election-day activities to get out the vote. With such a large proportion of voters actually voting well before Election Day, by the time a “72 Hour” push might begin, it was already too late. The Democrats were better at tailoring their efforts to the specific state laws that govern Iowa elections.

Thus, the major GOTV effort in Iowa was on the Democratic side. Mark Daley described this Democratic Party effort as a combination of “shoe leather and technology,”⁵³ a combination which served the Democrats well. According to Tom Harkin, the Democrats increased the number of doors they knocked on from 60,000 in 2000 to 230,000 in 2002.⁵⁴ This may have helped the party avoid some of the difficulties it faced in other elections across the nation this November.

The Effects of Money II: The Air War

The story of the air war in Iowa can be summed up in a single word: saturation. The way the district lines intersect with major television markets in Iowa meant that viewers in the two large eastern Iowa markets, the Quad Cities (Davenport) and Cedar Rapids/Waterloo, found themselves viewing ads for the First and Second Districts, the Senate race, and the governor’s race. Those in the largest Iowa market, Des Moines, saw ads from the same two statewide races, and two congressional districts, the Third and

and Dale Neuman, Colorado’s Seventh Congressional District by Daniel Smith, Indiana’s Second District by John Roos and Christopher Rodriguez and North Carolina’s Eighth District by Eric Hiberlig.

⁵³ Daley, interview, 8 November 2002.

⁵⁴ Cited in the box titled: “Back to the Future,” *Des Moines Register*, 11 December 2002, 8A.

Fourth. According to a press release issued by the Alliance for Better Campaigns and posted on their website, KWWL in Cedar Rapids broadcast the fourth largest number of political ads in the nation during the 2002 campaign, logging 9,017 ads. WHBF in Davenport was eighth in the nation with 8848 ads, and KCRG Cedar Rapids was tenth with 7,973 ads.⁵⁵ In addition, WQAD in Davenport ran 7,917 ads. Des Moines was not far behind these eastern Iowa markets as both KCCI and WHO played over 7,400 ads and WOI played 5,375. According to Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), in these three markets over 39,000 ads ran at a cost of over \$13.5 million.⁵⁶

Senate

In the Senate race, according to the CMAG data, Harkin outspent Ganske by \$2.2 to \$1.4 million (see Table 3.1). The Republican Party was unwilling to make up the difference. Ganske seemed to close the gap between Harkin and himself that was present after the primaries as a result of the so-called “Tapegate” scandal. Brian Conley, who had been a member of Senator Harkin’s staff in the 1970s, had donated money to the Ganske campaign and been invited to meeting of contributors with Ganske on September 3. Conley had, apparently at the urging of a member of the Harkin campaign staff, taped the meeting at which Ganske outlined a strategy to “go after” Harkin, and given the transcript to a newspaper reporter of the Quad City Times. The idea of releasing the transcript, apparently, was to put Ganske on the defensive for being a negative

⁵⁵ The data were compiled by the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), and released by the Alliance for Better Campaigns, 11 November 2002, At <<http://bettercampaigns.org/press/release.php?ReleaseID=40>>, 14 November 2002.

campaigner, though there was really nothing in the transcript that was all that revealing. The release of the transcript led to charges by the Ganske campaign that Harkin had illegally bugged his meeting. Harkin's campaign at first denied any knowledge of the incident, but campaign manager Jeff Link and a junior staff member resigned from the campaign on September 27. On that day, Larry Sabato moved the Iowa Senate race out of the "leaning Democratic" category to the "toss-up" category and his website said that Harkin "has put his career and reelection in serious jeopardy."⁵⁷ However, on the next day, the Des Moines Register published the results of a poll showing that Harkin still held a 54% to 34% lead.⁵⁸ Ganske was never able to link Harkin to the scandal in any direct way, and both the local Democratic District Attorney and Republican Federal Attorney concluded that there was no expectation that this meeting was to be confidential and that, therefore, no laws had been violated. Ganske was unable to parley this event into a lasting gain in support and by October 13, Larry Sabato had placed the race back into the "leans Democratic" category.⁵⁹ As a result, the NRSC decided to pull back on spending for Ganske in mid-October.⁶⁰ Iowa Republican Senator Chuck Grassley, however, convinced the NRSC to pay for a commercial where he made an appeal for support for Congressman Ganske. However, that was the last ad the NRSC made for the Ganske campaign, and in the final week of the campaign, Senator Grassley used his own committee to fund another ad in which he asked for support for the congressman.

⁵⁶ Data from CMAG, cited by the Alliance for Better Government, 11 November 2002. At <<http://bettercampaigns.org/states/index.php?StateID=ia>>, 12 December 2002.

⁵⁷ Quoted in Jane Norman, "Politics" *Des Moines Register On-Line*, <http://desmoinesregister.com/news/stories/c4789004/19326600.html>, 27 September 2002.

⁵⁸ Roos, Jonathan, "DSM Poll Taken During Scandal – Harkin Still With Big Lead," *Des Moines Register*, 28 September 2002, 1A.

⁵⁹ Cited in Norman, Jane, "Political Fortuneteller Sees Race Shifting Back To Harkin," *Des Moines Register*, 13 October 2002, 2B.

Harkin was able to use his advertising advantage to blunt any attacks from Ganske. When Harkin was attacked for statements concerning stem cell research and cloning, he responded with what might have been the single most effective ad of the campaign. This ad showed actor Michael J. Fox, visibly shaking from the effects of his Parkinson's disease, noting how Senator Harkin's strong support of stem cell research "which is very different than cloning life, something Senator Harkin opposes" might lead to cures for diseases which may affect "you or someone you know." The LCV also ran an effective ad for Harkin in which an "ordinary citizen" described how Harkin's concern for the environment had helped him battle a disease that likely came from contaminated ground water. While the AMA spent a fair amount of money trying to help Greg Ganske, without a large influx of party money, it was impossible for the Ganske campaign to turn things around. Perhaps this can best be seen by comparing the amount spent by the NRSC in this race as opposed to those it saw as competitive and close and those it never saw as competitive. According to Chris LaCivita, the Political Director of the NRSC, the NRSC spent over eight million dollars in Minnesota and Missouri, and close to seven million dollars in New Hampshire. On the other hand, they spent no money at all in Montana or New Mexico. In Iowa, they spent three and one-half million dollars, reflecting an early optimism that soon faded into a self-fulfilling prophecy of defeat.⁶¹

Iowa 1

⁶⁰ Cited in column by David Yepsen, "Watch Out, GOP: Absentee-ballot Drive is Democrat's Ace," *Des Moines Register*, 17 October 2002, 16A.

⁶¹ Chris LaCivita, NRSC Political Director, "FW: Activities By Category – Had a Busy Year!", Personal E-Mail to Jonathan Tanner, 11 December 2002.

In the air war in the First District, both candidates had reasonable war chests, and both political parties spent large amounts of money on television (see Tables 3.1 and 3.3). However, early on fundraising efforts did not go well for Hutchinson (at one point she had been outraised 5 to 1), so she was forced to “go dark.” At this point, the DCCC stepped in and kept pro-Hutchinson party ads on the air. Nussle’s campaign manager, Nick Ryan, commented that this DCCC involvement meant the NRCC had to respond, so both party committees became heavily committed into the First District.⁶²

At the same time, interest group involvement in the air war was minimal, with only the United Seniors Association making any substantial splash, spending \$400,000 on television in support of Nussle and running three different pro-Nussle ads in rotation. Nussle and Hutchinson had rough parity in the number of ads run by their respective campaigns and parties with Nussle and the Republican Party putting up fourteen unique ads and Hutchinson and the Democrats running twelve. While the number of unique ads was at near parity, neither the amount spent nor the nature of the ads was anywhere near equal. Based on collected ad buys at major stations, Nussle outspent Hutchinson by about \$734,000 to \$487,000 on TV. And while Hutchinson apparently spent no money on radio, Nussle put at least \$30,000 into this medium. More importantly, the quality and message of the TV ads favored Nussle. The NRCC came on strong with a series of attacks on Hutchinson that questioned her honesty and integrity. Using a court case in which a judge had called her testimony “not credible” and “not believable,” the NRCC blanketed the airwaves (and mail as well) with this message, her party switch, and application for a Republican White House job. One particularly effective ad asked the question: “Was she not telling the truth to President Bush then, or is she not telling the

⁶² Ryan, interview, 22 November 2002.

truth to us now?" The DCCC ads on Hutchinson's behalf did not address these attacks; instead, they focused on relatively generic Democratic themes. Hutchinson's own counter attack on Nussle was weak.⁶³

The general sense of what happened in the First District might be best summed up by the UAW's David Neil, who said, "I know how the Iraqis must feel being carpet-bombed."⁶⁴ Some substantiation for this impression comes from an analysis conducted by the *Quad City Times* estimating that 21,703 thirty-second political ads had been run between January and November 1, 2002.⁶⁵

Iowa 2

Meanwhile, in the highly competitive Second District, interest group activity in the air war was minimal. As one of the few Republicans endorsed by the LCV, Leach benefited by what was billed as a \$400,000 TV campaign on his behalf by the LCV.⁶⁶ The campaign consisted of two ads run in rotation, calling Jim Leach "one of the good guys" and a "steward of the land." The ads were folksy and effective in this liberal-leaning, conservation oriented district. The only other television ad by interest groups in the Second District was \$250,000 of television ads by the SEIU, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO whose membership base is almost entirely in the Second District. The ads focused

⁶³ Tibbetts, interview, 22 November 2002.

⁶⁴ Ed Tibbetts, "Nussle's Domination of Vote Extended to Bettendorf," *Quad City Times*, 7 November 2002.

⁶⁵ Ed Tibbetts, "Watchdog Group Counts 21,703 Television Sport," *Quad City Times*, 7 November 2002, 1.

⁶⁶ Our efforts to collect ad buy data from television stations in the Cedar Rapids and Quad Cities markets found only about \$150,000 worth of actual ad buys by the LCV.

on healthcare, the issue of most importance to SEIU, which has a strong base in organizing nurses.

Unlike the ground war in the Second District, much of the air war was waged by the candidates and parties (see Tables 3.1 and 3.4). Because of funding advantages, the Thomas campaign ran just over \$500,000 on TV and had better production quality. Leach's campaign spent about \$160,000 on TV and another \$30,000 on radio. Ultimately, the Thomas campaign saw Leach's ad strategy as surprisingly effective, especially in his constant call for positive campaigns and his attempts to keep out the national party and interest groups.⁶⁷

The Thomas party-produced ads, paid for by the Iowa Democratic Party, aimed at Leach's affiliation as a Republican linked to big business. They cited an instance in which Leach voted to raid the Social Security trust fund. They also ran an ad that claimed Leach had voted to eliminate the Department of Education. This helped spark a Leach response ad that countered the claim and said, "The most disturbing thing about modern campaigns is the negative ads"

Because Leach's campaign had raised so little money and because he refused to attack his opponent, the NRCC and the Republican Party of Iowa decided to come into the race and run ads both supporting Leach and attacking Thomas. When the ads began to run regularly near the start of September, Leach publicly announced that he had asked his party to stop running ads, calling the ads against Thomas distorted and unfair. The party, not surprisingly, ignored Leach's requests to stop running ads, and became the major player in the Second District television wars.

Iowa 3

In the Third District, the Boswell campaign became concerned when the NRCC made an ad buy of approximately \$485,000 in late July.⁶⁸ The Boswell campaign asked the DCCC to match the buy, which they agreed to do. But when the NRCC pulled their buy, the DCCC cut back as well, shifting some of their money to the Norris campaign in the fourth district.⁶⁹ In the race, the Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC) continued to run both TV and radio ads for Stan Thompson, while Club for Growth ran radio ads. One of the ABC radio ads for Thompson actually caused the Thompson campaign problems. The ad accused Boswell of “voting with the tax raisers.” When the Boswell campaign complained, a number of radio stations pulled the ad. This created additional difficulty when the *Des Moines Register*’s article about the “misleading Thompson ads” was used by the Boswell campaign in their ads as evidence that Stan Thompson was not someone who could be trusted. This further made it difficult for the Thompson campaign to raise doubts about the incumbent.⁷⁰ This advantage allowed Boswell to blunt charges that he might not fit the district and eventually led him to a comfortable victory.

Iowa 4

⁶⁷ Armstrong, interview, 15 November 2002.

⁶⁸ Thomas Beaumont, “Cheney Visit Strengthens Iowa’s Clout,” *Des Moines Register*, 31 July 2002, 1B.

⁶⁹ A campaign worker in the Boswell campaign provided this information. It was verified in the interviews with Julie Stauch, 12 November 2002, and with Mike Matthews, DCCC Political Director, by David Magleby and Nicole Carlisle, 12 November 2002.

⁷⁰ The newspaper article was Jonathan Roos, “Several Iowa Radio Stations Give ‘Misleading’ Political Ads The Ax,” *Des Moines Register*, 31 August 2002. The problems this caused the Thompson campaign were noted in an interview with Brian Dumas, Thompson Campaign Manager, by Arthur Sanders, 18 December 2002.

In the Fourth District, spending by the candidates was much more equal, and the air war was more competitive. Both candidates and parties ran a large number of ads (see Tables 3.1 and 3.6). The United Seniors Association also made a major effort for Latham, and may have helped to blunt what should have been a Democratic advantage on Social Security and Medicare. The Latham campaign and party ads were also particularly effective at using Norris' history of party activism to paint a picture of Norris as someone who would not fit this rural district. Norris and the Democrats had hoped that the more suburban nature of this new district would create problems for the Congressman. However, the ads from the Republican side attacking Norris for his affiliation with Jesse Jackson in the Iowa Caucus in 1984 and the endorsement he received from the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, a group the Republicans claimed would increase taxes, allowed Latham to turn the tables and make Norris' fit with the district a major issue. These ads claimed that a look at "Norris' friends" made it clear that Norris did not have "Iowa Values." By keeping Norris on the defensive, these ads helped Latham ward off a strong challenge.

The Air War in Iowa

In many ways, however, the most important airwave story across Iowa was not the particular ads that were run in each race, but rather was the impact of the enormous number of ads, primarily by the candidates and party committees, but also by interest groups. This saturation advertising disgusted people. They felt overwhelmed and often

tuned out the entire campaign. This was compounded by the large number of mailings people were receiving, as in addition to the federal races discussed here, the competitive races for state legislative offices flooded mailboxes as well.⁷¹ In addition to the spending detailed here, there was over twelve million dollars spent on the Iowa Governor's race,⁷² much of it on television ads, and over eight million dollars spent in state legislative races,⁷³ a good portion of which went to mailings. Despite a large number of highly competitive races and major efforts, especially by the Democrats, to turn out voters, turnout in Iowa was only 47 percent according to the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate,⁷⁴ eleventh best in the nation. This represented an increase of only 4.3 percent over 1998, a year that saw a competitive governor's race, but no competitive Senate or House races. People seemed to find the unrelenting negative ads in all of these races very difficult to deal with. Jim Leach made that the centerpiece of his campaign. And that also made it harder for everyone to get people to the polls.⁷⁵

Conclusion

In the end, all of the money, ads, spending, and efforts to get people to the polls led to a status quo election in Iowa. All of the incumbents in the federal races were reelected, as was the incumbent Democratic Governor. In fact, all incumbents, with the exception of Jim Leach, were easily reelected, with Leach winning 52 percent of the vote, his lowest reelection percentage ever. In addition, in spite of a few seats changing hands,

⁷¹ Staci Hupp, "More politics? Check the mail," *Des Moines Register*, 1 November 2002, 1A.

⁷² Money and Politics Iowa, <http://www.mapiowa.org/mr/2002alliowa.htm>, 13 November 2002.

⁷³ Money and Politics Iowa, <http://www.mapiowa.org/mr/2002dr2.htm>, 10 March 2003.

⁷⁴ Cited by Jane Norman, "Minnesota is tops on turnout list," *Des Moines Register*, 1 December 2002, 5B.

the net effect on both the Iowa House and Iowa Senate was absolutely no change in the balance of power.

These results do not mean that all of the activity was for naught. On an Election Day where the national trends saw a more highly energized Republican electorate and, consequently, higher Republican turnout and a slight shift toward Republican's direction, the Democrats in Iowa were able to counter that trend with a highly effective ground war that focused on a sophisticated GOTV drive combining old fashioned organizing with new technology. However, this effort was not enough to swing the election against any of the potentially vulnerable Republican incumbents (or have a similar effect at the state level). The money advantage that all of the incumbents had, with the exception of Leach, helped to keep them in office. In Leach's case, his money disadvantage was quickly overcome by a huge multimillion-dollar effort by the NRCC and smaller LCV television buys. Despite Leach's claim that he wanted no outside help, it is doubtful that he would have won without it. In general, in those races where overall spending levels were closest (Second and Fourth Districts) the incumbents had the toughest battles.

There was also a clear shift toward ground war-focused campaigns. The TV ads were everywhere, but because all of the candidates had enough money to have a visible presence on television, a greater effort was made to also maintain a presence in the mail and, especially in the case of the Democrats, through old-fashioned door knocking and personal contacts. But more than anything, the combined ground and air wars seemed to wear down the public, particularly the noncandidate campaigning. A Johnson County exit poll confirmed this as only 35 percent of voters thought that interest groups should be allowed to spend money to support or oppose candidates in an attempt to influence a

⁷⁵ All of the people we interviewed locally commented about this phenomenon.

campaign. And despite Jim Leach’s stand against interest group involvement in elections, it was Julie Thomas’s voters who were less tolerant of interest group activity.⁷⁶ By the end of the campaign and as each of the candidates struggled to break through the overwhelming crescendo of ads, both on the air and on the ground, it was the overwhelming crescendo, not any particular message, that seemed to be the loudest. And that was a sound which was not music to the public’s ear.

Table 3.1
The Air War: Most Active Organizations
Collected Ad-buy Data in the Iowa Senate and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Congressional District Races

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Candidates</i>	Citizens for Harkin	\$1,587,988	\$65,736	\$1,653,724	\$2,203,907
	Julie Thomas Campaign Committee	\$523,371	-	\$523,371	\$761,528
	Ann Hutchinson for Congress	\$487,655	-	\$487,655	\$230,876
	Boswell for Congress	\$378,960	\$25,461	\$404,421	\$418,295
	Norris for Congress	\$329,090	-	\$329,090	\$404,338
	Thomas For Congress	\$51,507	-	\$51,507	\$158,601
<i>Political Parties</i>	Iowa Democratic Party	\$2,956,035	\$666	\$2,956,701	\$3,177,244
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Labor	\$373,523	\$6,815	\$380,338	\$338,127
	LCV ^a	\$174,635	-	\$174,635	\$140,711
	Sierra Club ^a	\$22,500	\$1,200	\$23,700	\$93,535

⁷⁶ The exit poll was mounted by David Redlawsk’s political campaigning class in fourteen randomly selected precincts in Iowa City and Coralville, Iowa. The sample was well representative of voters at the polls in those two cities on Election Day. Interestingly, voters were split on whether Jim Leach or Julie Thomas got more help from outside groups, with 35 percent saying Leach, and 44 percent saying Thomas. Partisans were much more likely to think the candidate of the other party got more help, 67 percent of Thomas voters thought Leach got more help, while 70 percent of Leach voters thought Thomas got more help.

	NEA ^a	-	\$3,850	\$3,850	-
	New American Optimists	-	\$330	\$330	-

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Candidates</i>	Ganske for Senate	\$954,835	\$128,371	\$1,083,206	\$1,365,414
	Nussle for Congress	\$734,089	\$34,505	\$768,594	\$948,239
	Latham for Congress	\$749,380	-	\$749,380	\$356,574
	Thompson for Congress	\$371,003	\$11,250	\$382,253	\$409,907
	Iowans for Jim Leach	\$162,790	\$33,721	\$196,511	\$193,272

<i>Political Parties</i>	Republican Party of Iowa	\$3,034,206	\$9,780	\$3,043,986	\$1,459,943
	NRCC	\$345,158	-	\$345,158	\$1,002,371
	NRSC	-	-	-	\$203,735
	RNC	\$2,720	\$2,660	\$5,380	\$13,702
	Republican Central Committee of Iowa	-	\$2,040	\$2,040	\$118,608

<i>Interest Groups</i>	United Seniors Association	\$733,100	-	\$733,100	\$631,754
	American Medical Association	\$169,466	\$30,565	\$200,031	\$175,020
	Associated Builders and Contractors	-	-	-	\$109,902
	Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care	\$91,700	-	\$91,700	-
	The Grassley Committee	-	-	-	\$29,938
	Republican Leadership Council	-	\$17,999	\$17,999	-
	Alcohol Beverage Industry	-	\$14,752	\$14,752	-
	60 Plus Association	-	\$3,135	\$3,135	-
	Iowans for Tax Relief & Tax Education Foundation	-	\$2,922	\$2,922	-
	National Right to Life	-	\$1,200	\$1,200	-

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Coalition to Protect America's Healthcare	-	\$31,500	\$31,500	-
	Alliance for Energy and Economic Growth	-	\$15,025	\$15,025	-
	Iowa Farm Bureau Federation	-	\$11,840	\$11,840	-
	AARP	\$7,600	-	\$7,600	-
	Iowa Hospitals Association	\$5,250	-	\$5,250	-
	Parents for Equal Access	-	\$620	\$620	-

Source: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database and *CMAG* data.

- ^a Democratic ally organization that endorsed and helped Republican Jim Leach in the Iowa 2nd Congressional District. In all other Iowa races, the organization endorsed the Democratic candidates.
- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
 - Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.
 - The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House or Senatorial candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House or Senate races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table.
 - The ' - ' for an organization only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.
 - Because of the sheer volume of television and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete.
 - All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better depict the organization's overall activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
 - The Labor category listed above consists of all labor groups including the AFL-CIO and affiliates, and organizations not explicitly affiliated with the AFL-CIO, such as the United Food and Commerce Workers Union and the Service Employees International Union.
 - This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
 - Because ad-buy content was often non-descriptive and sometimes difficult to distinguish between the different races, data in this table is combined for all races studied in Iowa.

Table 3.2
The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations
Observed Activity in the Iowa Senate Race

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Citizens for Harkin	4	4	1	-	6	5	16	36

<i>Political Parties</i>	Iowa Democratic Party	-	26	1	-	2	-	11	40
	DNC	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	5
	County Democratic Parties	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
	DSCC	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1

<i>Interest Groups</i>	Labor	-	8	-	-	2	-	1 ^a	11
	NEA	-	7	1	-	1 ^b	-	-	9
	Planned Parenthood	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5
	Sierra Club	-	2	1	-	1	-	1	5
	Alliance for Retired Americans	-	1 ^c	-	1 ^c	1 ^c	-	-	3
	Human Rights Campaign	-	1	-	1	1 ^d	-	-	3
	LCV	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	3
	NARAL-PAC	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	Stop the Arms Race PAC	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	21st Century Democrats	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	American Federation of Govt Employees	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Association of Trial Lawyers of America ^e	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Council for a Livable World	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Iowa Citizen Action Network	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Iowa for Healthcare	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	New American Optimists	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Responsibility Opportunity Community PAC	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
SGMA International	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Ganske for Senate	8	8	-	1	3	3	22	45

<i>Political Parties</i>	Republican Party of Iowa	-	14	-	-	-	-	7	21
	RNC	-	10	-	-	1	-	1	12
	County Republican Parties	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
	NRSC	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1

<i>Interest Groups</i>	National Right to Life	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	4
	60 Plus Association	-	1 ^f	-	-	1 ^f	1 ^f	-	3
	Associated Builders and Contractors	-	-	-	-	-	1 ^g	1 ^g	2
	The Grassley Committee	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
	American Medical Assn	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Nat'l Right to Work Committee	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	US Chamber of Commerce ^h	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Blank Children's Hospital	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Honest Employment Group	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Iowa Association of Railroad Passengers	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1

Source: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database except where noted.

- ^a Video taped endorsement of Harkin shown at local union meetings. Sponsored by the Iowa Federation of Labor.
- ^b Jack Polidori, NEA Political Affairs Specialist, interview by David B. Magleby and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 15 November 2002.
- ^c Ed Coyle, Alliance for Retired Americans Executive Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 20 December 2002.
- ^d Mark Perriello, Human Rights Campaign PAC Manager, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Jonathan Tanner, 17 January 2003.
- ^e Unspecified race involvement. Linda Lipsen, Association of Trial Lawyers of America Senior Director of Public Affairs, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 19 December 2002.
- ^f Jim Martin, 60 Plus Association President, interview by Quin Monson and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2002.
- ^g Ned Monroe, Associated Builders and Contractors Director of Political Affairs, interview by Quin Monson and Jonathan Tanner, Washington D.C., 9 December 2002.
- ^h Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.
- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro-conservative or liberal.
- All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
- The Labor category listed above consists of all labor groups including the AFL–CIO and affiliates, such as the Iowa Federation of Labor, and organizations not explicitly affiliated with the AFL–CIO, such as the United Auto Workers.
- This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 3.1.

Table 3.3
The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations
Observed Activity in the Iowa 1st Congressional District Race

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Ann Hutchinson for Congress	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	8
<i>Political Parties</i>	Iowa Democratic Party	-	15	-	-	1	-	7	23
	DNC	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
	Scott County Democratic Party	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	DCCC	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Labor	-	5	-	1	2	-	-	8
	NEA	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	4
	Alliance for Retired Americans	-	1 ^a	-	1 ^a	1 ^a	-	-	3
	EMILY's List	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	NARAL-PAC	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	New American Optimists	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Responsibility Opportunity Community PAC	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Sierra Club	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Nussle for Congress	-	3	-	-	3	1	11	18
<i>Political Parties</i>	NRCC	-	13	-	-	-	-	3	16
	Republican Party of Iowa	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6
	Republican House Conference	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	RNC	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	United Seniors Assn	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
	NRA	-	1 ^b	-	-	1 ^b	-	-	2
	National Right to Life	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
	National Right to Work Committee	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	60 Plus Association	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	America 21	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	NFIB ^c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	The Seniors Coalition	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	US Chamber of	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

	Commerce ^d								
	Unknown Organization	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest Groups</i>	AARP	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Blank Children's Hospital	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1

Source: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database.

^a Ed Coyle, Alliance for Retired Americans Executive Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 20 December 2002.

^b Chuck Cunningham, NRA Director of Federal Affairs, interview by David B. Magleby, Quin Monson, Jonathan Tanner, and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C. 7 November 2002.

^c Unspecified race involvement. Sharon Wolff, NFIB Campaign Services and PAC Director, Dennis Whitfield, NFIB Senior Vice President, Political and Media Communications, and Kristen Beaubin, NFIB, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington D.C., 8 November 2002.

^d Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.

- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro-conservative or liberal.
- All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
- The Labor category listed above consists of all labor groups including the AFL-CIO and affiliates, such as the Iowa Federation of Labor, and organizations not explicitly affiliated with the AFL-CIO, such as the United Auto Workers.
- This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 3.1.

Table 3.4
The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations
Observed Activity in the Iowa 2nd Congressional District Race

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Julie Thomas Campaign Committee	12	9	-	1	3	8	33
<i>Political Parties</i>	Iowa Democratic Party	-	14	1	1	-	6	22
	DNC	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
	DCCC	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Labor	-	8	-	-	2	1	11
	Alliance for Retired Americans	-	1 ^a	-	1 ^a	1 ^a	-	3
	EMILY's List	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	IA for Healthcare	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	NAACP	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	NARAL-PAC	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	National Committee for an Effective Congress	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	People for the American Way	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Planned Parenthood ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Responsibility Opportunity Community PAC	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Iowans for Jim Leach	1	2	-	1	3	10	17
<i>Political Parties</i>	NRCC	-	11	-	-	-	3	14
	Iowa Republican Party	-	1	-	-	-	2	3
	Jefferson County Republican Party	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
	RNC	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	NEA ^c	-	2	1	-	-	-	3
	Republican Main Street Partnership	-	2	1	-	-	-	3
	60 Plus Association	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
	LCV ^c	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	Sierra Club ^c	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
	United Seniors Assn	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
	Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	US Chamber of	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

	Commerce ^d							
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Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Person	Phone	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Blank Children's Hospital	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Business and Professional Women/USA PAC	1	-	-	-	-	-	1

Source: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database.

- ^a Ed Coyle, Alliance for Retired Americans Executive Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 20 December 2002.
- ^b Unspecified race involvement. David Williams, Planned Parenthood Director of Action Fund and PAC, interview by David B. Magleby and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2002.
- ^c Normally a Democratic ally organization that endorsed and helped Republican Jim Leach.
- ^d Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.
- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro-conservative or liberal.
- All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
- The Labor category listed above consists of all labor groups including the AFL-CIO and affiliates, such as the Iowa Federation of Labor, and organizations not explicitly affiliated with the AFL-CIO, such as the Service Employees International Union.
- This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 3.1.

Table 3.5

The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations
Observed Activity in the Iowa 3rd Congressional District Race

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Boswell for Congress	14	5	-	1	-	4	24
<i>Political Parties</i>	Iowa Democratic Party	-	13	-	1	-	3	17
	DNC	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
	Polk County Democrats	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Labor	-	5	-	1	-	-	6
	NEA	-	3	1	-	-	-	4
	Sierra Club	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
	Responsibility Opportunity Community PAC	1	-	-	-	-	-	1

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Thompson for Congress	6	4	-	-	-	7	17
<i>Political Parties</i>	NRCC	-	4	-	-	-	1	5
	Republican Party of Iowa	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
	RNC	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Associated Builders and Contractors PAC	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
	Club for Growth	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	National Right to Life	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	US Chamber of Commerce ^a	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest Groups</i>	AARP	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Blank Children's Hospital	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Iowa Association of Railroad Passengers	-	1	-	-	-	-	1

Source: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database.

^a Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.

- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro-conservative or liberal.
- All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
- The Labor category listed above consists of the AFL–CIO and affiliates, such as the Iowa Federation of Labor.
- This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 3.1.

Table 3.6
The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations
Observed Activity in the Iowa 4th Congressional District Race

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Phone	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Norris for Congress	-	6	-	-	2	8
<i>Political Parties</i>	Iowa Democratic Party	-	6	-	-	3	9
	DNC	3	-	-	-	-	3
	Story County Democratic Party	-	-	1	-	-	1
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Labor	-	5	-	1	-	6
	NEA	-	4	1	-	-	5
	Iowa Citizen Action Network	-	3	-	-	-	3
	Sierra Club	-	-	1	-	2	3
	NARAL	-	1 ^a	-	-	-	1
	Responsibility Opportunity Community PAC	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Stop the Arms Race PAC	-	1	-	-	-	1

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Phone	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Candidates</i>	Latham for Congress	-	1	-	-	4	5
<i>Political Parties</i>	Republican Party of Iowa	-	9	-	-	-	9
	NRCC	-	4	-	-	3	7
	RNC	-	-	-	1	1	2
<i>Interest Groups</i>	United Seniors Association	-	-	-	-	3	3
	60 Plus Association	-	1	-	-	-	1
	NFIB ^b	-	-	-	-	-	1
	National Right to Life	-	1	-	-	-	1
	US Chamber of Commerce ^c	-	-	-	-	-	1

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	E-mail	Mail	News	Phone	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Blank Children's Hospital	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Iowa Association of Railroad Passengers	-	1	-	-	-	1

Source: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database.

- ^a Kate Michelman, NARAL President, and Monica Mills, NARAL Political Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby, Quin Monson, and Nicole Carlisle, 19 December 2002.
- ^b Unspecified race involvement. Sharon Wolff, NFIB Campaign Services and PAC Director, Dennis Whitfield, NFIB Senior Vice President, Political and Media Communications, and Kristen Beaubin, NFIB, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington D.C., 8 November 2002.
- ^c Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002.
- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro-conservative or liberal.
- All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
- The Labor category listed above consists of the AFL–CIO and affiliates, such as the Iowa Federation of Labor.
- This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 3.1.

**Table 3.7
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures 2001–2002**

Tom Harkin (D) - IA Senate	
Contributions from PACs	\$1,441,247
Contributions from Individuals	\$5,152,613
Contributions from Party	\$18,480
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0
Other Contributions	\$404,500
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$7,016,840
Total Expenditures	\$6,727,132
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$496,722

Greg Ganske (R) - IA Senate	
Contributions from PACs	\$779,685
Contributions from Individuals	\$3,740,882
Contributions from Party	\$31,921
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$402,000
Other Contributions	\$471,809
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$5,426,297
Total Expenditures	\$5,334,084
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$92,233

Ann Hutchinson (D) - IA 1	
Contributions from PACs	\$341,033
Contributions from Individuals	\$498,068
Contributions from Party	\$15,000
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$165,097
Other Contributions	\$1,712
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$1,020,910
Total Expenditures	\$1,020,908
Cash on hand as of 12/05/2002	\$0

Jim Nussle (R) - IA 1	
Contributions from PACs	\$979,490
Contributions from Individuals	\$628,406
Contributions from Party	\$44,390
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0
Other Contributions	\$42,712
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$1,694,998
Total Expenditures	\$1,664,779
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$53,230

Julie Thomas (D) - IA 2	
Contributions from PACs	\$394,707
Contributions from Individuals	\$701,193
Contributions from Party	\$11,931
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$230,484
Other Contributions	\$976
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$1,339,291
Total Expenditures	\$1,329,517
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$9,347

Jim Leach (R) - IA 2	
Contributions from PACs	\$0
Contributions from Individuals	\$525,496
Contributions from Party	\$7,514
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$110,000
Other Contributions	\$4,008
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$647,018
Total Expenditures	\$647,579
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$13,737

Leonard Boswell (D) - IA 3	
Contributions from PACs	\$829,736
Contributions from Individuals	\$400,788
Contributions from Party	\$9,369
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0
Other Contributions	\$20,045
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$1,259,938
Total Expenditures	\$1,247,742
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$82,906

Stan Thompson (R) - IA 3	
Contributions from PACs	\$248,791
Contributions from Individuals	\$592,886
Contributions from Party	\$28,174
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$24,400
Other Contributions	\$3,560
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	\$897,811
Total Expenditures	\$896,676
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$1,134

Table 3.7
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures 2001–2002 (Cont.)

John Norris (D) - IA 4		Tom Latham (R) - IA 4	
Contributions from PACs	\$571,234	Contributions from PACs	\$987,452
Contributions from Individuals	\$697,468	Contributions from Individuals	\$432,503
Contributions from Party	\$4,268	Contributions from Party	\$29,917
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0	Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0
Other Contributions	\$934	Other Contributions	\$7,930
Total Receipts	\$1,273,904	Total Receipts	\$1,457,802
Total Expenditures	\$1,216,317	Total Expenditures	\$1,506,691
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$31,050	Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$47,228

Source: "2001-02 U.S. House and US Senate Candidate Info," *FECInfo*, 25 November 2002. At <http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_statedis.exe>, 13 January 2003.