Semmel, Ehrlich, Grunberg, Normative Treverton, Dallmayr, Carens, Burke, Bay, Rubinson, Mitchell, Kaplan, Dawisha, Karen, and Philip Hanson, eds. Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent .......... Nish Jamgotch, Jr. 448
Grunberg, Leon. Failed Multinational Ventures:
The Political Economy of International Divestments .................................................... Allen Hershkowitz 449
Mitchell, C. R. Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role .................................................. Abbott A. Brayton 451
Rubinson, Richard, ed. Dynamics of World Development ..................................................... Kevin J. Middlebrook 452
Semmel, Bernard, ed. Marxism and the Science of War ......................................................... John M. Caravelli 453
Skilling, H. Gordon. Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia ............................................ Joseph Kalvoda 454
Treverton, Gregory, ed. Crises Management and the Super-Powers in the Middle East ................... James A. Sundberg 454
Treverton, Gregory, ed. Energy and Security ................................................................. Mohammed E. Ahrari 455

Normative Theory
Bay, Christian. Strategies of Political Emancipation .............................................................. Robert Booth Fowler 456
Burke, John P., Lawrence Crocker, and Lyman Legters, eds. Marxism and the Good Society ............................................................... Charles E. Ellison 457
Dallmayr, Fred R. Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics ................................................................. Edwin Fogelman 459
Ehrich, Stanislaw, and Graham Wootton, eds. Three Faces of Pluralism: Political, Ethnic, and Religious ......................................................... Walker Connor 460
Feenberg, Andrew. Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory ............................................... John Bokina 462
Gilbert, Alan. Marx's Politics: Communists and Citizens .......................................................... Arthur DiQuattro 463
Lane, David. Leninism: A Sociological Interpretation ............................................................... Alan Whitehorn 464
Nordlinger, Eric A. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State .................................................. Otwin Whitehorn 465
Redenius, Charles. The American Ideal of Equality: From Jefferson's Declaration to the Burger Court ........................................................................ M. Susan Power 466
Turner, Bryan S. For Weber: Essays on the Sociology of Fate ...................................................... Robert Eden 466
Urry, John. The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies: The Economy, Civil Society and the State ........................................................................ Sanford N. Greenberg 467
Vajda, Mihaly. The State and Socialism: Political Essays ......................................................... E. Gene DeFelice 468

Empirical Theory and Methodology
Clubb, Jerome M., and Erwin K. Scheuch, eds. Historical Social Research: The Use of Historical and Process-Produced Data .................................................... Samuel P. Hays 470

Annotations

210
to the Federal Republic of Germany. Such basic disagreements within a single anthology are fine if addressed, but here they are simply ignored.

Some of the manuscripts suffer from the fact that they were presented at conferences in 1976 and 1978 and have not been updated. Thus, the essay on India was written before the second coming of Indira Gandhi, that on Canada before the Quebec referendum, and that on Germany before the recent outbreak of riots. These developments hold great significance for the theses advanced in the essays.

We read on the jacket that “Altogether, as you see, not the great synthesis of a great mind, but many tasty dishes, and considerable coherence.” It is evident that this reviewer failed to perceive coherence. But he did find five of the dishes worth sampling. Rupert Breitling’s history of the concept of pluralism is workmanlike. Robert Presthus offers empirical data for questioning the validity of both Madisonian and elitist theories and suggests directions for a “post-pluralist theory of democratic stability.” Klaus von Beyme’s assessment of trends in the FRG is up to his usual standards of objective and well-documented scholarship. (On the basis of the number of citations, von Beyme, with some seventy, is easily the winner. By contrast, Robert Dahl cites only four works, three of which he had himself authored.) Finally, anyone interested in the Fleming-Walloon cleavage will find much of interest in Paul Claeys’s contribution.

WALKER CONNOR

Belmont, Vermont


Critics of liberalism have often claimed that central to its theory of politics is an entirely limited understanding of human nature. As Marx complained of Bentham: “With the dryest naïveté he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man.” The utilitarianism of Bentham, James Mill, and Austin does not satisfactorily confront man in his historical world. Nor does nineteenth-century utilitarianism successfully address some of the most fundamental problems in politics: How are men actually motivated in politics, how is obedience to law cultivated, and what is the actual basis for political authority. The modern crisis of liberalism can be traced to its inability to motivate men in history and to justify its own exercise of political authority.

In this enlightening study, Eldon J. Eisenach shows us that liberalisms as defined by its own major philosophers has always had to grapple self-consciously with these problems. Indeed, the “two worlds of liberalisms” refers to the dual nature of liberal thought as it confronted the inadequacy of its own dominant rational approach. Anyone who has puzzled over the fourth book of Leviathan (“Of the Kingdom of Darkness”) or Locke’s religious writings would do well to read Eisenach’s interpretation of this forgotten side of early liberal thought. However, the reader should be warned that the book is no introduction to the theorists of liberalism, but rather presupposes a detailed familiarity with much of the tradition.

The thrust of Eisenach’s argument is that Hobbes and Locke presented more than just rational appeals for a political community based upon self-interest. The timeless and a historical argument of the “state of nature” is meant for the few and rational. However, reason alone does not motivate most of mankind. As Locke put it in the Reasonableness of Christianity: “Human reason unassisted failed men in its great and proper business of morality.” For most men, scripture and institutional religion have more appeal than rational arguments for civil government. The best chapters in Eisenach’s book are those on Hobbes and Locke which show that these seminal theorists also argued from a perspective of sacred history. Historical religion as well as superstition leads men away from rational principles. Men are willing to kill and die for their religion and their “father-king.” Eisenach argues that the effort to reduce religion to a “primitive Christianity” was central to Hobbes and Locke’s concern with freeing civil government from the “enthusiasm” of historical religion. In this form, religion would reinforce the obligation to obey the sovereign. Religion is attacked not from outside of the Christian tradition, but rather from within: “The familiar liberal attack on priesthoods, rituals, and church establishments might deter us from recognizing that the basis of this critique was often itself religious, and from seeing how the theological perspectives of Reformed Protestantism were consciously incorporated into liberal thought” (p. 6). In short, we have lost touch with this religious framework of liberalism as it has been overwhelmed by the rationalist perspective.

Eisenach locates the writings of Hobbes and Locke within the context of seventeenth-century Protestant thought and argues that the liberal tradition itself was always suspended between the two worlds of interest/reason and religion. The latter part of this study traces liberal thought over the course of the next century as it abandoned the religious perspective altogether and became wholly of one world—secular rationalism. The argu-
ment here is perhaps less convincing, if only because it is less developed. Hume, Bentham, Austin, and Smith are considered, and their commitment to "natural reason" is explored. Theories of utility, law, and natural history are portrayed as representative of the nineteenth-century assumption that history has reached "a culmination in which interest and reason are the only significant realities remaining" (p. 115). The religious world of liberalism was left behind. In its place utilitarianism stressed the persuasive force of popular opinion on one hand, and the brute force of the state on the other. "While civil society is defined by individual action, personal interest, and voluntary exchange, the political order protecting it is defined by necessity and physical coercion" (p. 118).

A final and thoughtful chapter on John Stuart Mill does much to illustrate Eisenach's contention that liberalism is suspended between two worlds. Mill himself recognized the limitations of the world of interest and reason, but could not return to the outmoded world of sacred history. Mill's failure to discover successfully any third alternative helps to explain the problem of contemporary liberalism. Eldon Eisenach's insightful and important book does much to explain this inner tension in liberal thought and also to add to our understanding of liberalism in its fullest expression.

SHELDON POLLACK

University of Pennsylvania

Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory.


The arrest of the New Left and neo-Marxism as immediately practicable political impulses has been accompanied by a number of books which have broadened our understanding of the intellectual tradition that nurtured, in unforeseen and sometimes unwanted ways, the activism of the streets, schools, and workplaces in the sixties and early seventies. The work of Georg Lukács has been particularly well-served in this theoretical renaissance. Michael Löwy's Georg Lukács—From Romanticism to Bolshevism (London: NLB 1979) traced Lukács's political development within a sociology of German and Hungarian intellectuals during the first decades of this century. Andrew Arato and PaulBreines's The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism (Seabury Press 1979) focused on the same development and the same period from the standpoint of intellectual history. Feenberg, who stu-

died under Herbert Marcuse and the leading French Lukácsian, Lucien Goldmann, shares the preoccupation with the young Lukács of the previous books but subordinates historical concerns for contemporary themes. Here the young Lukács joins the young Marx as the legatees of Hegel and the founders of a "philosophy of praxis" of continuing if problematic importance within social theory.

Feenberg views Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Lukács's History and Class Consciousness as the complementary foundations of a "meta-theory of philosophy," i.e., inquiries into the very possibility of human self-reflection on the conditions of human life. In the broadest terms, Marx wrests the essential insight of the constitutive role of conscious productive activity in human life from idealist and empiricist distortions. Lukács, in turn, extends Marx's penetration of the "fetishism of commodities" into a general critique of the "reification" of culture under capitalism. In both cases, the true and only realization of philosophy lies in social revolution—a revolution neither prompted by an ethical imperative nor guaranteed by historical laws, but a possibility which may be realized. Feenberg indicates the importance of this philosophy of praxis for subsequent currents in Marxism, while defending Marx and Lukács against some of their critics.

All is not homage to the masters. While Feenberg argues that the Achilles heel of both Marx and Lukács lies in their conceptions of nature, it is in his attempt to resolve these difficulties that Feenberg achieves his goal of demonstrating the relevance of seemingly dusty and abstract philosophical conundrums not only to contemporary social theory but to politics as well. The argument defies brief summation. Let it suffice to say that from the perspective of Marx's and Lukács's philosophy of praxis, nature tends to be absorbed in a "creationist" fallacy of unlimited human potency or abandoned as an eternal other standing outside the dialectic of subject and object. Both tendencies vitiate the philosophy of praxis. Yet the general direction of a possible resolution to the antinomy of nature and history can be found in Marx's provocative but undeveloped notion of the cultivation and emancipation of the senses. In his discussion of a more passive, aesthetic, remembered (erinnert) relationship between the human being and nature, Feenberg's pervasive affinity for the positions of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School becomes explicit.

The prose is lucid, the numerous section headings helpful, and the relegation of tangential material to the footnotes welcome. Yet the character of the beast in question, the philosophy of praxis, is daunting, and would seem to require the