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a priori justification, intuitions in philosophical inquiry, confirmation theory and indexical credence, metaphilosophy
Publications
Articles
"No Double-Halfer Embarassment: Reply to Titelbaum." (2023). Analytic Philosophy 64: 346-354.
"Dutch Books and Logical Form." (2021). Philosophy of Science 88: 961-970.
"A Conflict Between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation." (2021). Philosophy of Science 88: 385-397.
"Philosophical Appeals to Intuition." (2017). In The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Intuition." (2017/2012). In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Zalta (ed.).
"Empirical Evidence for Rationalism?" (2014). In Intuitions, D. Rowbottom & A. Booth (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
"Beauty and Generalized Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani." (2014). Erkenntnis 79: 687-700.
"Critical Notice of Hilary Kornblith's On Reflection." (2014). Episteme 11: 53-61.
"Skepticism, Reason and Reidianism." (2013). In The A Priori in Philosophy, A. Casullo & J. Thurow (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
"Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and
Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan." (2013). Synthese 190: 1489-1501.
"Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence." (2012). Journal of Philosophy 109: 295-315.
Video of talk at the 2010 Formal Epistemology Workshop
"Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference." (2011). Analysis 71: 290-293.
"Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty." (2008). Synthese 164: 281-287. [with Kaila Draper]
"Horgan on Sleeping Beauty." (2008). Synthese 160: 91-101.
"Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation." (2007). Journal of Philosophy 104: 269-289.
"Probabilistic Arguments for Multiple Universes." (2007). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 288-307. [with Kaila Draper & Paul Draper]
"Natural Selection and the Traits of Individual Organisms." (2004). Biology and Philosophy 19: 765-779.
"On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity." (2004). Dialectica 58: 71-87.
"Kitcher on Tradition-Independent A Priori Warrant." (2002). The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 373-376.
"Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions." (2001). Philosophical Studies 106: 227-258.
Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual 24 (2003).
"Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism." (2001). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 201-220.
"Warrant and Analysis." (2000). Analysis 60: 51-57.
"External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism and The Simulation Theory." (1999). Mind and Language 14: 113-130.
"Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence." (1998). In Rethinking Intuition, W. Ramsey & M. DePaul (eds.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. [with Alvin Goldman]
Reprinted in Alvin Goldman's Pathways to Knowledge. (2002). New York: Oxford University Press.
"Induction, Focused Sampling and The Law
of Small Numbers." (1996). Synthese 108:
89-104.
"Defusing the Combinatorial Explosion." (1995). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 392-393.
Books
Intuitions as Evidence. (2000). New York: Routledge.
Reviews
"A Priori Justification." (2005). Mind 114: 124-128. [Review of Albert Casullo's A Priori Justification. (2004). New York: Oxford University Press.]
FURTHER INFORMATION