Joel Pust
professor of philosophy @ the university of delaware

Philosophy @ UD Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Phil Papers:
Online Research in Philosophy
Phil People: Online Directory of Philosophers Graduate Study in Philosophy: The Philosophical Gourmet


Fall, 2021
    PHIL 320: Theory of Knowledge

Spring, 2022
    PHIL 330: Philosophy of Mind

Courses Taught:
    Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 102)
    Philosophies of Life (PHIL 100),
    Contemporary Moral Problems (PHIL 202)
    Theory of Knowledge (PHIL 320),
    Philosophy of Mind (PHIL 330)
    Senior Seminar: A Priori Justification (PHIL 465)
    Senior Seminar: Skepticism (PHIL 465)
    Senior Seminar: Intuitions in Philosophy (PHIL 465)
Senior Seminar: Time, Self, and Evidence (PHIL 465)
    Senior Seminar: Debunking and Disagreement (PHIL 465)


Current Research

a priori justification, intuitions in philosophical inquiry, confirmation theory and indexical credence, metaphilosophy



"Dutch Books and Logical Form."  forthcoming (2021) Philosophy of Science.

"A Conflict Between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation."  (2021).  Philosophy of Science 88: 385-397.

"Philosophical Appeals to Intuition."  (2017).  In The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

"Intuition."  (2017/2012).  In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Zalta (ed.).

"Empirical Evidence for Rationalism?"  (2014).  In Intuitions, D. Rowbottom & A. Booth (eds.).  New York: Oxford University Press. 

"Beauty and Generalized Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani."  (2014).  Erkenntnis 79: 687-700.

"Critical Notice of Hilary Kornblith's On Reflection."  (2014).  Episteme 11: 53-61.

"Skepticism, Reason and Reidianism."  (2013).  In The A Priori in Philosophy, A. Casullo & J. Thurow (eds.).  New York: Oxford University Press.

"Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan."  (2013).  Synthese 190: 1489-1501.

"Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence."  (2012).  Journal of Philosophy 109: 295-315.

¬Video of talk at the 2010 Formal Epistemology Workshop

"Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference."  (2011).  Analysis 71: 290-293.

"Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty."  (2008).  Synthese 164: 281-287[with Kaila Draper]

"Horgan on Sleeping Beauty."  (2008).  Synthese 160: 91-101.

"Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation."  (2007).  Journal of Philosophy 104: 269-289.

"Probabilistic Arguments for Multiple Universes." (2007).   Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 288-307.  [with Kaila Draper & Paul Draper]

"Natural Selection and the Traits of Individual Organisms."  (2004).  Biology and Philosophy 19: 765-779.

"On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity."  (2004).   Dialectica 58: 71-87.

"Kitcher on Tradition-Independent A Priori Warrant."  (2002).  The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 373-376.

"Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions."  (2001).  Philosophical Studies 106: 227-258.

¬Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual 24 (2003).

¬Reprinted in Methods in Analytic Philosophy: A Contemporary Reader, J. Horvath (ed.).  Bloomsbury.  (forthcoming).

"Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism."  (2001).   Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 201-220.

"Warrant and Analysis."  (2000).   Analysis 60: 51-57.

"External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism and The Simulation Theory."  (1999).   Mind and Language 14: 113-130.

"Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence."  (1998).  In Rethinking Intuition, W. Ramsey & M. DePaul (eds.).  Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  [with Alvin Goldman]

¬Reprinted in Alvin Goldman's Pathways to Knowledge.  (2002).  New York: Oxford University Press.

"Induction, Focused Sampling and The Law of Small Numbers."  (1996).  Synthese 108: 89-104.

"Defusing the Combinatorial Explosion."  (1995).  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 392-393.


Intuitions as Evidence.  (2000).   New York: Routledge.


"A Priori Justification."  (2005).  Mind 114: 124-128.  [Review of Albert Casullo's A Priori Justification.  (2004).  New York: Oxford University Press.]


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My Erdös No. is at most 6
[Me - A. Goldman - M. Shaked - S. Kochar - Y. Chaubey - G. Babu - P. Erdos]

Mailing Address:
Department of Philosophy

University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716


 [my first initial and my last name] [at] udel [dot] edu

Directions to my office at UD