# Economic Outlook Robert Fry

Robert Fry Economics LLC

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
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# **Economics**

The science of explaining tomorrow why the predictions you made yesterday didn't come true today.


#### **US Interest Rates**

Percent (Monthly data)




# **US Treasury Yield Spread**

10-Year Treasury Note minus 3-Month Treasury Bill, Percent



# **US M2 Money Supply**





# Leading indicators have called for recession.

Rates have never risen this much without a recession.

Since 1970, yield curve has never been inverted without a recession.

M2 has never declined without a recession.


Conference Board's Leading Economic Index has never fallen this much for this long without a recession.

# Recession:

a significant decline in economic activity that is spread across the economy and lasts more than a few months . . . based on a range of **monthly** measures of aggregate real economic activity published by the federal statistical agencies. – nber.org

### **US Coincident Indicators**


February 2020 peak = 100



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics/FRED

# **US Employment Millions** 165 Recessions -Civilian Employment 155 —Nonfarm Payrolls 145 135 125 115 105 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23

# **Initial Claims for Unemployment Insurance**



Source: U.S. Employment and Training Administration/FRED

# The long-expected recession hasn't arrived.

Payroll employment still rising through August.

Real personal consumption expenditures still rising through July.

Real personal income excluding transfers still rising through July.

**But** 

Industrial production peaked in September 2022.


Civilian employment peaked in November 2023\*.

Real manufacturing & trade sales peaked in December 2023\*.

**ALL DATA ARE SUBJECT TO REVISION!** 

"Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future."

Niels Bohr, 1885-1962 Nobel Laureate, 1922



# Why no recession (yet)?

#### Fiscal stimulus has offset monetary tightening.

- Excess savings from 2020-21 pandemic relief packages.
- Bipartisan Infrastructure Act, CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act.

#### **Economy is less interest-sensitive than in the past.**

- 2017 TCJA increased standard deduction, reduced deductions for mortgage interest.
- Businesses & homeowners locked in long-term financing when interest rates were low.
- Higher interest income of risk-averse elderly savers is offsetting higher interest expenses.

#### Maybe oil prices mattered more than interest rates all along.


#### Monetary policy did work . . . on inflation.

- Share-gaining retailers quickly met declining demand with lower prices.
- Usually money affects volume first, but there is no reason it should.

#### Monetary policy lags are longer than we thought they were.

- They usually are. (Yield curve inversions have led by as much as 17 months.)
- Fixed-rate mortgages have delayed (not averted) the impact.

# US Federal Govt Current Expenditures & Revenue



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis/FRED

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
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
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## **US Housing Starts & Building Permits**

Millions, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate




## **US Light Vehicle Sales & Production**



## **US Personal Interest Income and Payments**

Billion \$, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates



Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office/FRED

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
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
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#### **Brent Blend Oil Price**

US Dollars per Barrel



## Global Crude Oil and US Natural Gas Spot Prices




# **US Regular Gasoline Price**


Dollars per gallon, Weekly data



#### **Gasoline Price and Consumer Sentiment**



#### **US Oil & Gas Production**



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
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
# **US Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index**







#### **US Consumer & Producer Price Indexes**

Percent Change from Year Ago






# **US Civilian Unemployment Rate**




# **US Job Openings: Total Nonfarm**



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics/FRED

## US Employment Cost Index: Total compensation Percent



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics/FRED

# Inflation rose and fell faster than the Fed expected

Rise in inflation was bigger and more persistent than the Fed expected. Fed had to raise rates more than it planned.

## **Supply CONSTRAINTS boosted PRICES.**

• Supply **constraints** were due mostly to strong demand and restocking, not to supply **disruptions**. Imports & semiconductor shipments set records.

#### "Inflation" has come back down.

- Did monetary tightening work without hurting the US economy?
- Did weakness abroad (China, Europe) help bring down inflation?
- Has increased immigration brought labor costs down?
- Was apparent increase in "inflation" really a one-off jump in prices?

Inflation has never fallen this much without a recession.

The Fed is done. But has the damage been done?

# Why no recession (yet)?

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
- They usually are. (Yield curve inversions have led by as much as 17 months.)
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"The crisis takes a much longer time coming than you think and then it happens much faster than you would have thought."

Rudiger Dornbusch 1942-2002




#### **S&P 500 Stock Price Index**



#### **US Real Gross Domestic Product**

Annualized Growth Rates




07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26


# Industry Detail

### **US Industrial Production: Manufacturing**

Index, 2017=100




# US Industrial Production & Employment: Manufacturing Index, 2017=100 Millions



# Global Overview


#### **Industrial Production ex Construction**

Index, 2021 = 100




#### **Industrial Production ex Construction**

Percent Change from Year Ago



### Value Added of Industry (Industrial Production): China Percent Change from Year Ago



### Industrial Production, Manufacturing: European Union

Index, 2021 = 100




Global GDP Growth													
(Annual Percent Change)													
	<u>2019</u>	<u>2020</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2024</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2027</u>	<u>2028</u>			
World	2.4	-3.2	6.2	3.1	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.5			
North America	2.4	-2.5	5.8	2.1	2.4	2.4	1.1	2.2	2.0	2.0			
Latin America (x Mex)	0.3	-5.9	6.9	3.9	1.9	1.7	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.4			
Western Europe	1.6	-6.3	6.4	3.6	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4			
C & E Europe	2.6	-1.9	7.2	1.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.6			
Middle East & Africa	1.5	-3.1	4.7	4.8	2.2	2.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.5			
Asia/Pacific	3.6	-1.2	6.4	3.3	4.2	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.3			
China	6.0	2.2	8.4	3.0	5.2	4.6	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.4			
Japan	-0.4	-4.2	2.7	1.2	1.7	0.0	1.2	8.0	0.6	0.6			
India	3.9	-5.8	9.7	7.0	7.8	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5			

Global Industrial Production Growth												
(Annual Percent Change)												
	<u>2019</u>	2020	2021	2022	2023	<u>2024</u>	2025	<u>2026</u>	2027	<u>2028</u>		
World	0.6	-4.7	7.5	3.1	0.9	0.5	1.6	3.5	2.5	1.8		
Advanced economies	-0.7	-6.3	6.1	2.1	-1.1	-0.8	0.9	3.2	2.2	1.0		
United States	-0.7	-7.1	4.4	3.4	0.2	0.0	8.0	3.4	1.9	1.4		
Japan	-2.4	-10.5	5.6	0.1	-1.5	-3.0	1.5	3.5	2.0	0.0		
Euro Area	-1.1	-7.8	8.4	2.0	-2.0	-3.0	1.0	3.5	2.5	0.5		
Emerging economies	2.0	-3.0	8.9	4.0	2.9	2.1	2.4	3.8	3.0	2.7		
China	5.8	2.2	10.6	3.7	4.3	5.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5		
Emerging Asia ex China	0.5	-12.1	12.2	5.0	2.5	2.5	3.5	5.0	5.0	4.0		
E Europe & CIS	3.0	-2.0	4.4	-1.5	3.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0		
Latin America	-5.8	-9.0	8.1	3.2	0.9	0.5	2.0	4.0	1.5	1.5		
Middle East & Africa	-3.1	-8.5	1.7	7.2	-1.6	-2.5	1.0	3.5	2.0	1.5		

#### **Federal Reserve Broad Dollar Index**

*January 2006 = 100* 



# Key takeaways

The Fed might actually pull off the elusive soft landing, where US inflation falls to the Fed's 2% target without a recession.

But risk of US recession remains elevated because of past interest rate hikes.

If there's no recession, there won't be a strong recovery either.

Europe had a mild recession; now stagnating. Don't expect recovery until US economy reaccelerates or energy prices fall.

Chinese growth hurt by shrinking population, bad policy.

## **Key risks**

# Geopolitical risks: Russia/Ukraine, Israel/Palestine, China/Taiwan

The first two work primarily through energy prices, the third through trade.

### The Fed might be too late in cutting. (It usually is.)

- Raises risk of recession & low inflation in short run, high inflation in long run.
- Recession in US would slow growth in rest of world.

### Fiscal deficits will slow long-term growth.

- Primary cause of fiscal deficits around the world is failure to adjust retirement ages for longer life expectancies.
- Most likely impact is slower long-term growth, not debt crises.
- US only has fiscal sanity with divided government (e.g., Clinton/Gingrich).
- Unless central banks tighten in response, inflation will go back up.

## Longer term

# Labor is likely to remain the scarce factor of production in developed countries.

- Labor shortage is demographics, not just COVID fears and bad policies.
- Seven highest years for US births were 1956-62.

### Reshoring looks attractive but will be limited.

- Pandemic, geopolitics, port/shipping constraints argue for moving supply chains out of China and closer to markets.
- Capital-intensive business can move to developed countries. Labor-intensive business can't (without major immigration reform).
- "Friendshoring" more likely for labor-intensive business.

### India will grow faster than China going forward.

# **Robert Fry Economics LLC**

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robertfryeconomics@gmail.com


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RobertFryEconomics.com

# **Appendix**


### **US Real Personal Consumption Expenditures**

Billion 2017 \$, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis/FRED

### **US Heavy Truck Sales**



### Is this like the 1970s?

### Similarities to 1970s

**Higher energy prices** 

**Higher food prices** 

Policymakers blame supply shocks for consequences of THEIR (demand) policies.

High inflation BEFORE food and energy prices spiked

It will probably take a recession to get inflation down to an acceptable level.

### **Differences from 1970s**

### **Demographics**

 Young adults are inflationary; create huge demand for housing and motor vehicles. Old adults are more willing to defer spending.

#### Globalization

 Free trade reduces inflation, despite some backtracking.

Fed got serious after one year of high inflation rather than after 13.

Prices are more flexible now.