Douglas F. Stalker
at the back of
This webpage is for people who not only can read but like to
read. If you are a click-away, bullet-items type, don't go on. If you want to
read, do go on. The following are not bare-bones lists or one liners. The
sections explain, annotate, and try to put things in their context (in their
where, what, and why). Warning: they are opinionated, too, in many places. If
you are a delicate petunia, consider yourself alerted. The first three sections
are about me, and the last two are for you, who are presumably a prospective or
former student, though they are also for anyone who wants to learn a few things
and exercise their brain a bit.
WHAT DO I TEACH?
I have taught the following courses over the
Introduction to Philosophy
Philosophy of Art
Philosophy of Literature
Elementary Symbolic Logic
Science or Pseudoscience
Philosophy of Science
Mentality and Machines
Upper level seminars on art and expression and on Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art.
I introduced Critical Thinking, Science or Pseudoscience, and Inductive Logic into the curriculum at the University of Delaware, and informally co-taught biostatistics with my late friend, Henry Tingey, a biostatistician.
WHO AM I?
I received my B.A. in philosophy from the University of
Minnesota in 1969; my M.A. in philosophy from the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill in 1972; and my Ph.D. in philosophy from UNC-Chapel Hill in 1974.
At Minnesota I studied with Herbert Feigl, who was a member of the Vienna Circle
and a leading figure in logical empiricism. At North Carolina, I studied with,
and did my degrees with, Paul Ziff, who was a major figure in philosophy of
language and aesthetics 1960-1980. My M.A. thesis was on the notion of natural
logic and my doctoral thesis was on Noam Chomsky's notion of deep structure. I
am currently Associate Professor of philosophy at the University of Delaware,
and have held visiting appointments in philosophy at the University of Illinois
at Chicago Circle and North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I have been a consultant to the Educational Testing Service in connection with the analytical section of the GRE Aptitude Test, the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, the Office of Technology Assessment inquiry into unorthodox cancer treatments, and the Delaware Division of the American Cancer Society. For a number of years I was a member of the National Committee on Unproven Methods of Cancer Management of the American Cancer Society, a member of the American Philosophical Association's Committee on Philosophy and Medicine, and the Biometry Section of the Medical Research Institute of Delaware. I have served on the Board of Directors, Professional Education Committee, and Public Education Committee of the Delaware Division of the American Cancer Society.
I have given talks at meetings of the American Philosophical Association, American Society for Aesthetics, American Bar Association, American Statistical Association, American Cancer Society; conferences at Carnegie Mellon University, The Medical Center of Delaware, Mt. Sinai Medical School, Delaware Academy of Medicine, Wilmington Hospital, Lehigh Valley Association of Independent Colleges; colloquia at the University of Maryland, University of California at San Diego, the Chicago Art Institute, Notre Dame, the Fullerton Club, Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art, University of Miami School of Medicine, Medical Center of Delaware, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Departments of Art History, College of Nursing, and Food Science and Nutrition at the University of Delaware. From 1979-87 I gave my popular, satirical presentation "Winning Through Pseudoscience" at more than 35 colleges, universities, professional meetings, and high school gatherings. The presentation has been the subject of more than 20 newspaper, wire service, and magazine articles (e.g., Philadelphia Inquirer, Chicago Tribune, Scientific American, Delaware Today).
WHAT HAVE I PUBLISHED?
My publications are in the areas of philosophy of language, of
art, of mind, of science, as well as in literature and music, even sports. Here
are some annotated selections. My doctoral thesis, suitably revised, came out as
a monograph from Temple University Press in 1976. The monograph was titled
Deep Structure and it was the first, extended examination of Chomsky's
claim that each sentence has a deep structure. Philosophers were interested in
this idea because of their previous interest in the logical form of sentences,
their emphasis on the connection between meaning and many philosophy problems,
and the fact that transformational grammar was all the rage back then--it was
supposed to be the key to understanding all things linguistic. My monograph not
only asks what is a deep structure but also how would you know that a
sentence had a certain one. It is an epistemic inquiry in the philosophy of
linguistics and can be seen as an instance of the theoretical/observation term
issue in the philosophy of science. Both W.V. Quine and Nelson Goodman told me
that they found the monograph a useful work. Indeed, Quine wrote me to discuss
my use of his work on variables explained away in the last chapter.
When I taught in Chicago, my office was next to Clark Glymour's office, and we became good friends and have worked together on some publications, typically on things that struck us as anywhere between intellectually irritating and irrational. We wrote a paper on holistic medicine that was published in The New England Journal of Medicine (title: "Engineers, Cranks, Magicians, Physicians"). This paper has been anthologized in a volume on crises in health and in our own anthology Examining Holistic Medicine (1985, Prometheus Books). Our anthology covers the "philosophical", methodological, and therapeutic views of holism: its history, claims about responsibility, intrusion into nursing, quality of its journal, and therapies from acupuncture to vitamin C for cancer. The review in The Journal of the American Medical Association called the volume "dynamite" and "an absolute smash," and said all health care professionals should buy a copy. It was the first serious, critical look at the medical fringe, and still is the standard work on the topic.
My edited volume Grue! The New Riddle of Induction (Open Court) came out in 1994. Nelson Goodman's grue problem has been around for more than half a century and articles discuss it each year in the top journals. My volume has 15 essays from over the years, and half of them were written for the volume, while many previously published essays have postscripts written for the volume. The volume also includes a 180-page, reduced-type, annotated bibliography (annotations running from 5 lines to a page). In typescript, my bibliography was closed to 500 pages in all. The volume has name-brand contributers such as Frank Jackson, W.V. Quine, John Earman, Patrick Suppes, Gilbert Harman, Clark Glymour, Elliott Sober, and John Pollock. Nelson Goodman wrote that "this is a monumental document in the history of twentieth-century philosophy."
My articles that have attracted the most attention (judged by their being anthologized) include "Why Machines Can't Think: A Reply To James Moor," which is about explaining the results of Turing's test; "The Malignant Object: Thoughts on Public Sculpture" (with Clark Glymour), which examines rationales for placing modern sculpture in public places; "B.F. Skinner's Theorizing" (with Paul Ziff), which discusses Skinner's fascination with behaviorism as philosophy vs. technology, and to which Skinner himself replied; "How to Duck Out Of Teaching," which is a satirical look at fashionable approaches to teaching in higher education circles. For those who enjoy German lieder and French chansons, I have 120 CD reviews (1998-2002) in the American Record Guide, and an interview with one of the top classical singers around, Austrian Wolfgang Holzmair.
WHAT ARE MY INTERESTS?
Here are some of my vocational and avocational interests that
may not be apparent or indicated in more than a passing way in other sections of
Philosophy in general. I am a card-carrying analytic philosopher who has always been interested in the greats of 20th century analytic philosophy, most of the basic problems of philosophy you would cover in Intro., and I can be found reading everything from the history of logic to ethics (from Boole on syllogistic to Harman on relativism). Analytic philosophy may not be everything, but is the sine qua non. The music of my people, you might say, starts with Russell and goes through the positivists, ordinary language folks, Quine and Goodman, and the like. Lately, I have been haunted by the free will problem, especially when it gets over to fatalism (e.g., Richard Taylor and my old teacher Steven Cahn).
Philosophy of art in particular. The standard big three topics here have been defining art, evaluating art, and the value of art. I am more interested in the second and third, as well as the role of notation in the arts (e.g., Goodman's theory of notation), and understanding aesthetic properties (from the beautiful to the dainty and dumpy, as Austin put it). On a more practical day, I am interested in rules of thumb that would help art fans make sensible decisions about these things, and lifting things from other fields, such as signal detection theory, to get a new angle on old aesthetic problems. Of necessity, you might say, I am always on the lookout for hooey about the arts. Beautyville isn't populated with all that many sober types, unfortunately, and it is too easy to find lots of fluffy types writing in and around it. If you take the arts seriously, you should want sense and not nonsense, serious arguments and not handwaving, and the usual standards of clarity and precision in philosophical writing about the arts. Too many people seem to let their brains fall out when the topic becomes art, even philosophers, who suddenly tolerate babble they would not in other areas of philosophy. (Some of my articles and reviews spank, as it were, such writing about the arts: e.g., "Rhyme Without Reason" in the festschrift for Paul Ziff; a reply to critics of my article on public sculpture (Public Interest, 1982), my review of a volume titled Esthetics Contemporary (JAAC, 1979) and of one titled Looking Critically (JAAC, 1986).)
Medical Topics. From laetrile to vitamin C to spinal fusion to NSAIDs to cholesterol tests to chemotherapy to controlled trials and surrogate endpoints etc.-- they all come down to one big idea: medical evidence. (Medical people would say I am concerned with methodology, which is just finding rules that take you to good evidence.) My concern with alternative (complementary, even crank) medicine is a concern with diagnostic tests and therapies that are not supported by good evidence, and, even worse, the people promoting them do not appreciate what counts as good evidence here. Ditto for the evidential status of mainline medical claims, theories, and therapies, and that is an on ramp to improving how physicians and other health care professionals reason and make decisions (and thus, to put it more generally, with critical thinking in medicine). Patients (and I'm one -- who isn't?) also need to be better at weighing evidence and reasoning through medical things; thus my interest in topics on that side as well.
Debunking/Critical Thinking. Spotting fallacies, debunking goofy views, and reasoning better have always been high on my list. If you can't think straight, you should feel a panic attack coming on each time you contemplate this sad state of affairs. I do, and so started a critical thinking course here in the late 70s --as much to improve my noggin as well as those of the students. I am especially interested in inductive reasoning, and think that reasoning with numbers (probabilities and statistical whatnots) should be the main item in an ideal critical thinking class. Thus I am always trying to learn more about this end of logic/reasoning, often from my friend at George Mason University, David Schum, who is a probability expert (see his books in our library), and my friend at Carnegie-Mellon University, Clark Glymour, who is a causal reasoning expert (yes, see his books in our library). Some colleagues have said that everything I do is critical thinking in one way or another--that is my area. Fine by me.
Other Academic Fields/Topics. I need an intellectual girdle. My interests range over too many disciplines in the curriculum: physical and social science, languages and literature, music, physical education, you name it. For example, I have audited classes on microbiology, biostatistics, and Beethoven's string quartets. Currently I am trying to learn some microeconomics (e.g., Gary Becker, David Friedman, and Steven Landsburg). There is more to being educated than philosophy, and more philosophy majors should realize that there are philosophically interesting things in other fields if you look for them. Those microeconomists are descendants of Bentham and Mill, to cite one case.
The Arts. My main interests have been poetry, painting, and classical music. To be more specific: collecting contemporary American poetry (people like Ammons, Ashbery, Tate); writing/publishing poetry (e.g.,in Poetry Northwest, Poetry Texas, The South Dakota Review); discussing poetry with poet friends (e.g., Jonathan Williams, William Harmon, the late A.R. Ammons). With painting: hundreds of works on paper (pencil, conte, charcoal, watercolor, mixed media) and on canvas (acrylic, oil, mixed media) in a raw, expressionistic style, often of human faces and figure studies. With classical music: six years of voice training in lieder and opera, thus an interest in performance practice; reviewing, mainly lieder (e.g., Schubert's song cycles); of course collecting CDs, attending concerts and recitals.
Athletics. Yes, fuddy duddy professors (admittedly few) are interested in sports, but I tend to favor the individual sports and their whys and wherefores. While young I competed in various sports (football, field, ice hockey, wrestling) but chose to concentrate on an odd, minor, underground sport: Olympic style weightlifting. I had the opportunity to train at Bob Hoffman's York Barbell Club in York, PA in the 60s, when Americans were still winning medals and championships in world competition--when we had lifters such as Tommy Kono, Norbert Schemansky, Ike Berger, Bill March, and Gary Cleveland. I continued in college (training with Gary Cleveland) until I realized that I was not going to be a champion. In the past ten years I have dabbled in the training and thinking end of the sport (especially the biomechanics of form and, as the headlines dictate, the hoopla over "performance enhancing" drugs); and I remain in contact with some the greats and near greats of the 60s and discuss lifting fine points with a former Olympic and world champion on an almost daily (email) basis. Unlike most professors, you may see me down at the athletic complex watching the shot put events or in the stands at the softball games (at one time half the team had taken my Intro. course). Not surprisingly, I continued to exercise with weights for many years and would compete in one offbeat thing or another from time to time: e.g., I have done the Empire State Building run-up and gone to a professional wrestling camp in KY and had one pro match in TN. Those days are over (sports injuries accumulate) but I still enjoy helping athletes train and learning about the technical side of their sports.
HOW DO YOU THINK?
This section is both pre and post. That is, it gives you a
sample of what you may encounter in one of my classes, and also a way to see if
you got something out of one of my classes.
Philosophy Puzzles. Here are two famous philosophy puzzles to think about and that I have discussed, at one time or another, in Intro. And then two problems that could show up in my philosophy of art course. The first two come from an old course manual I used for Intro., A Conceptual Zoo, and the second pair come from a manual I used for aesthetics, Welcome To The Beauty Parlor.
1. The statement "Maine has many lakes" is about Maine. Since Aroostook County is in Maine, the statement "Aroostook County grows potatoes" seems also to be about Maine. So also, since Maine is in New England, do the two statements "New England is north of Pennsylvania" and "New England States are small." Apparently we speak about Maine whenever we speak about anything contained in (whether as a part, member, member of a member, etc.) Maine, and whenever we speak about anything that contains Maine. But to accept this principle is to be saddled with the conclusion that any statement about anything is a statement about Maine. Consider the statement "Florida is Democratic." According to the principle stated, this is about the United States and therefore about Maine. The statement "Satellites are planets," since it is about the universe and thus about whatever is in the universe, would also be about Maine. Our dilemma is this. Given any statement, we can argue plausibly that it is about Maine. On the other hand, to admit that every statement is about Maine is to make utterly pointless any assertion that a given statement is or is not about anything in particular. Just where did we go wrong? (Nelson Goodman first stated this problem and pursued it in a series of articles with his student Joseph Ullian).
2. Consider this claim: All polar bears are white. Is it true? What would tend to confirm it? Presumably every white polar bear you run across. Each would count as evidence for the truth of the claim. The general principle involved here seems to be that everything that is both an A and a B stands as a confirming instance of the claim "All As are Bs." Now it clearly must be true that whatever is evidence for a given claim is evidence for any logically equivalent claim; for a logically equivalent claim is merely another way of saying the same thing. Well, the claim "All non-white things are non-polar bears" and the claim "All polar bears are white" are logically equivalent claims. By our general principle concerning evidence, anything that is not white and not a polar bear--for example, an old black shoe--confirms the former claim that all non-white things are non-polar bears. This old black shoe must therefore also be confirming evidence for the equivalent claim that all polar bears are white. We are to conclude, then, that we can confirm the claim that all polar bears are white by assembling old black shoes and such objects. Or are we to conclude this? (Carl Hempel first stated this problem and wrote on it.)
3. Consider an original painting by Rembrandt and a recent forgery of it--a forgery so deceptive that at present you can't see any difference between the forgery and the original. To be sure, the results of microchemical, microscopic, and kindred analyses bespeak which is which: to the left is the original, and on the right is the imposter. But save for such indicators, you're adrift here. You can't tell the paintings apart, at least for now, by merely looking at them. And there are no guarantees: you may never be able to tell them apart by merely looking at them. Confessing the present and perhaps permanent inability, can there be any aesthetic difference between the two paintings for you now? Why not hang a perfect fake in the living room? (Nelson Goodman first wrote on this problem.)
4. Many old timey (early 20th century) aestheticians thought there was something ineffable about a work of art. Here is what John Dewey said: "If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only by immediately visible and audible qualities, and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put into words is to deny their distinctive existence." Can you pin down what Dewey is saying here, and then do you believe any of it? (This sort of view can also be found in D.W. Prall, Suzanne Langer and others, when aesthetics hadn't been retooled by analytic types, back pre 1950.)
Here are three Analysis problems. The journal
Analysis used to have a contest: here is a problem, send in your entries,
the best will be printed in the journal. The journal hasn't done this in
1. In April 1958, John Austin reported on the submissions for this problem about generalizations. Consider "All swans are white or black." Does this refer to possible swans on canals of Mars? (This is 1958, so pre space probes and all that NASA stuff.)
2. Another oldie but goodie from their contests: Is it possible that one and the same individual object should cease to exist and, later on, start to exist?
3. One of my favorites, and one of the last Analysis problems, this time from the 70s. There exist just 100 tablets in a certain script, as yet undeciphered. Scholar A considers all of the tablets and works out a decipherment which makes sense of them. Independently, scholar B selects 50 of the tablets and from them works out a decipherment which he or she then tries out, successfully, on the other 50. Is one of these scholars behaving more rationally than the other? If so, which and why? If their decipherments differ, does the difference in procedure give any reason to accept one rather than the other?
Assorted Problems. Here are three problems I hand out the first
day of my critical thinking class.
1. Back in 1995 on a talk show on CNBC, the host was talking with a former L.A. district attorney about the O.J. Simpson trial. A caller phoned in to say: Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz is one of the Simpson defense team, and Dershowitz said that he would not put a lying witness on the stand, so if Simpson doesn't take the stand, then we know he's guilty. Neither Grodin nor his guest said a thing about this comment; they simply ducked. Do you agree with the caller?
2. I sent away for the literature on a back exercise machine that is supposed to relieve back pain. The literature includes a summary of a test of the machine's worth. Over a period of six years, 1,400 male and female patients aged 15 to 71 years with acute and chronic lumbar and cervical pain used the machine three times a week for three to eight weeks. Of the 1,400 patients, 85% (1,224) experienced satisfactory relief from their pain with equal frequency in acute and chronic cases, male and female patients, as well as lumbar and cervical cases. There were no instances in which the machine increased the pain or worsened the underlying cause. Less than 1% (seven patients) did not benefit from the therapy. Should I buy this machine?
3. A 1998 episode of the tv show "Law And Order" was about a serial murderer who liked to watch tv. He was being defended by a Harvard law professor who admitted that his client committed the murders, but argued that there were mitigating circumstances: viz., his client's tv viewing led to his sociopathic behavior. The law professor put an expert witness on the stand--the head of the National Advisory Committee on Television Violence. The expert claimed that violent tv shows are causing an epidemic of violent behavior among today's youth. In support of his claim, the expert cited the fact that, among young people who have been convicted of violent acts, an alarmingly high percentage of them--close to 80%--spent most of their leisure time watching violent tv. Assistant D.A. Jack McCoy responded to this (in his cross-examination) by noting that 80% of juvenile offenders probably chewed gum, too. There is a much better response--indeed, a fallacy worth noting. What is it?
WHAT SHOULD YOU READ?
If you took my Introduction to Philosophy course and want more
reading that is easy, accessible, and short, try these ten. 1. What Does It
All Mean? by Thomas Nagel. Compact discussions of standard and not so
standard problems (skepticism to death). 2. Paradoxes by R.M. Sainsbury.
For example: Zeno's paradoxes, Sorites arguments, Newcomb's problem, grue
paradox, Prisoner's dilemma, the Surprise Exam, the Liar, Russell's paradoxes.
3. The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. A classic introduction
from one of the greats of 20th century philosophy. Concentrates on big questions
from epistemology and metaphysics. 4.Wittgenstein's Poker by David
Edmonds and John Eidinow. Two British journalists introduce famous people and
debates in the history of 20th century philosophy--founders of the analytical
school. 5. Dilemmas by Gilbert Ryle of Oxford University. Major figure in
ordinary language philosophy shows how to dissolve philosophy problems through
linguistic analysis; explains how many problems result from category mistakes.
6. Logic by Wesley Salmon. A useful survey of basic points in logic and
well-known forms of argument, both deductive and inductive. Also covers
definitions. 7. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics by Bernard Williams.
Chapters on amoralism, subjectivism relativism, defining morality, meaning of
"good," God and ethics, human nature and ethics, utilitarianism. 8.
Metaphysics by Richard Taylor. Chapters on mind-body problem, free will,
fatalism, causation, God's existence, space and time, and more. Well worth it.
9. The Practice of Philosophy by Jay F. Rosenberg. A how-to book.
Chapters on arguing, criticizing, writing about, and reading
philosophers/philosophy books and articles. Just the thing for essay exams and
term papers. 10. Why Does Language Matter To Philosophy? by Ian Hacking.
Explains why so much of contemporary philosophy is concerned with the meanings
of words. Surveys the views of people such as Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer,
If you took my Critical Thinking course and want to read more, here are ten short, snappy, and accessible books to look at: 1. Innumeracy by John Paulos. Subtitle: mathematical illiteracy and its consequences. Covers gaffs involving numbers in the real world: e.g., statistical fallacies. Actually was a best-seller, got the author on the Tonight Show. 2. The Web Of Belief, 2nd edition, by W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian. Learn how to do hypothesis reasoning by looking for the virtues of a plausible hypothesis. A useful way of looking at your beliefs and trying to keep them rational. 3. Irrationality In Everyday Life by Robyn Dawes. Subtitled: how pseudo-scientists, lunatics, and the rest of us systematically fail to think rationally. Very practical look at common fallacies in reasoning with probabilities. 4. Calculated Risks by Gerd Gigerenzer. A self-help book on reasoning with probabilities. Subtitle: how to know when numbers deceive you. Claims to present a sure-fire way to estimate probabilities accurately, and painlessly. 5. Learning To Philosophize by E.R. Emmet, or Thinking With Concepts by John Wilson. Either will do. Both teach you to think like an analytic philosopher about any idea problem or claim--how to do conceptual anaylsis. Lots of examples and exercises. 6. Logic by Wesley Salmon. Also in the list for those who took my Intro. A solid survey of the basics to cope with common types of arguments. 7. Thinking Straight by Antony Flew. Jam-packed with good things: distinctions, errors to avoid, discussions of this and that which will add to your mental tool kit. 8. Decision Traps by Edward Russo and Paul Schoemaker. Subtitle: the ten barriers to brilliant decision-making and how to overcome them. Uses realistic business examples to cover points from the work of Tversky and Kahneman. Used most in business schools. 9. Elementary Logic by Willard Van Orman Quine. Elegant introduction to deductive logic in symbols, develops a test for validity of truth functional arguments and a procedure for proving, if you can, that a quantifier argument is valid. 10. Reason And Argument by Peter Geach. Very short chapters on consistency, inference, definitions, explanations, conditionals, practical reasoning, testing plurative arguments with Lewis Carroll diagrams.
If you took my Philosophy of Art Course and want to read more in that area, here are ten things to look at: 1. Languages of Art by Nelson Goodman. The best book in aesthetics in the past 50 years, though not easy in the main chapters. 2. Philosophic Turnings by Paul Ziff. Includes some of his well-known essays on defining and evaluating art. "Reasons in Art Criticism" is a tour de force. 3. Meaning and Truth in the Arts by John Hospers. A clear and sober look at typical claims in the arts that involve these ideas. Good for sobering up. 4. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism by Monroe Beardsley. Surveys no end of topics and argues for his own view on each. 5. Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Criticism by Jerome Stolnitz. Another good survey of standard topics by a cultured philosopher. 6. Aesthetics and Language edited by William Elton. Collects the essays that put aesthetics on notice that the analytic philosophers had come to the beauty parlor. 7. Philosophy Looks at the Arts edited by Joseph Margolis. Only the 1962, first edition. Contains many classic essays. Later editions do not. 8. Art and Philosophy edited by William Kennick. One of the last anthologies to have mainly top essays by top people (two thirds; the other third are obvious within a page of each). 9. Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics by Frank Sibley (edited by Benson, Redfern, and Cox). Sixteen essays by a well-known figure. Topics include defining art, defining aesthetic terms, reasons in art criticism, objectivity. 10. Antiaesthetics by Paul Ziff. Nine essays on antiart, dance, art and soiciobiology, aesthetics of sport, the identity of a piece of music, Wiitgenstein's writings on aesthetics, the limits of analysis. Iconoclastic, engaging.
Other Readings: If you are a philosophy major, then try to read as many of these ten classics of analytic philosophy as you can before you graduate: 1. Word and Object, W.V. Quine. 2. From A Logical Point of View, W.V. Quine. 3. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Nelson Goodman. 4. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein. 5. Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein. 6. Logic and Language, 1st and 2nd series, edited by Antony Flew. 7. Collected Papers, J.L. Austin. 8. Logical Positivism, edited by A.J. Ayer. 9. The Concept of Mind by Gilbert Ryle. 10. Sense and Sensibilia, J. L. Austin. Certainly there are other books to read, but these will get you with the program--the dominant school of thought in philosophy since 1900 at least.
HOW ABOUT SOME LINKS?
Ziff (UNC Tribute)